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I.        Introduction 
'Wo other single health care system has ever experienced the incredible complexities of the 
Defense Health Program, especially with the added challenges . . . of supporting a war.'" 
The Department of Defense's military health care system, entitled TRIG ARE, brings together 
the direct health care resources of the Department of Defense and supplements this capability 
through the use of managed care support services contracts and purchased care. This blended 
system is charged with providing a comprehensive health benefit to approximately 8.9 million 
beneficiaries, including active duty and retired uniformed services members, their families, and 
survivors, while also providing medical support to military operations.    The defense health 
program differs in so many ways from other employer-sponsored health plans that the label itself 
seems inappropriate at times, as this discretionary budget program resembles more of an 
entitlement than a benefit. 
In the late 1980's and early 1990's, faced with escalating health care costs, a transition to 
managed care seemed like an understandable and natural response to what was then a national 
belief that market forces could improve health care quality and lower costs.   The concept of 
managed competition proliferated as managed care took hold in the United States and became 
the cornerstone of many private and public health plans, including the Federal Employee Health 
' Defense Health Programs: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Total Force, House Comm. on Armed Services, 108* 
Cong. (2004) (opening statement of Rep. John McHugh, Chairman) [hereinafter Defense Health Program House 
Hearing 2004]. 
^ While the Department of Defense's military health care system provides worldwide care, this paper will 
specifically focus on the provision of care within the United States. 
' James A. Morone, Populists in a Global Market, J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 887 (1999) (noting managed 
competition stretches far beyond health care, and operates in a context of fierce global capitalism). 
Benefit Plan (FEHBP).''   FEHBP has received bipartisan recognition as one of the government's 
more successful undertakings and a model for federal health insurance purchasing, as health care 
reform proposals frequently focus on expanding the FEHBP. ^ Comparable in size to TRIG ARE, 
the FEHBP currently covers nine million active and retired federal employees and their 
dependents, and is the nation's largest employer-sponsored health insurance plan. Not 
surprisingly, some have argued the logical result would have been for the military to adopt the 
FEHBP as their purchased care model. Nonetheless, despite the existence of this highly regarded 
experience in federal health care purchasing, the defmed-contribution, passive purchaser model 
was viewed as incompatible with the military health care system's underlying missions and 
design and was thus rejected. 
The Department of Defense's unique approach to its health care system design, and rich 
benefit structure, however, in certain fundamental respects work at odds with what lies at the 
base of managed care theory and has limited the military health care system's ability to achieve 
the goals it so fervently sought. Congressional Budget Analysts have already observed that 
medical spending, for each dollar of cash compensation, for military members is substantially 
higher than it is for federal civilian employees or private-sector workers. Fiscal Year 2003 
defense health spending totaled $27.2 billion. The latest government study indicates if current 
trends continue, defense health-care spending could increase by roughly 50 percent to nearly 
double the current budget by 2020.^ Notwithstanding this huge investment and escalating costs, 
beneficiary groups and providers alike have voiced dissatisfaction and frustration with the 
TRICARE program. 
* The FEHBP "is often referred to as the original prototype of managed competition." Mark A. Hall, Managed 
Competition and Integrated Health Care Delivery Systems, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1,3(1994). 
^ See, e.g., the Congressional Plan put forth by Senator and putative Democratic nominee John Kerry. 
^ CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, GROWTH IN MEDICAL SPENDING BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (2003), at 
ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/45xx/doc4520/09-09-DoDMedical.pdf 
Despite the best of intentions, the military health care system faces continual challenges. 
The very duality of the Department of Defense's health mission and the need to maintain 
extensive facilities and medical personnel in a permanent readiness status create a singular 
situation that made transformation to a competitive model of managed care more complex and 
difficult. System design, including a demand for customization in order to incorporate and 
maximize the embedded direct health care resources of the military, and heavy regulation by 
Congress and the Department of Defense, operated as major barriers to full market competition 
and limited the natural operation and power of the market. Additionally, the ever-increasing 
nature of both covered benefits and eligible beneficiaries has resulted in the Department of 
Defense having great difficulty curbing military health care costs and utilization. 
The application of market purchasing strategies, which has proven elusive in the civilian 
market, was an even bigger disappointment in the Department of Defense system because of the 
constraints under which it labored. Additionally, while some of the problems experienced by the 
military in their transition to managed care were not all that different from other employers, the 
very complex transformation to TRICARE took place under the public eye with great 
Congressional scrutiny, and the military was not offered the same learning curve that other, less 
visible plans labored through. The evolution to managed care has not been a smooth one. 
Mistakes happen in every system^ but the public accounting of the Department of Defense's 
transformation to managed care was a unique factor. 
^ Including network adequacy, inability to recognize and accurately predict the true cost of care, disparate benefit 
and cost-sharing packages for similarly situated categories of beneficiaries and beneficiary backlash due to a 
perception of reduced benefits. 
^ Alain C. Enthoven and Sara J. Singer, The Mechanics of Backlash: Unrealistic Expectations Born of Defective 
Institutions, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 931, 936 (1999): 
Managed care ... is an innovation and work in progress. In response to demands by government 
and employers for cost containment, there is a great deal of trial and error as plans try to figure out 
new ways to control costs while not injuring or antagonizing patients. Mistakes are inevitable. 
Further complicating this complex transformation was the public nature of the purchasing 
and the fact that Department of Defense beneficiaries were viewed as a special class worthy of 
entitlement. As a result, in many ways the military health care system shares more similarities 
and challenges with Medicare than they do the FEHBP, as the former programs struggle to 
contain rising health care costs with only a limited ability to shift costs and drive beneficiary and 
provider behaviors. The egalitarian-like characteristics of these two programs, coupled with 
heavy regulation and government cost controls limit their ability to capitalize on the advertised 
benefits of managed care reform. Moreover, in some aspects the military health care system has 
even less flexibility than the Medicare program does due to the generous and uniform nature of 
military health care benefits, while costs to beneficiaries have remained lower than any other 
federal or private employer insurance program. 
This article analyzes key issues in the Department of Defense's transformation to a 
customized system of managed care by exploring several of the biggest issues of law and policy 
as they emerge from a comparison of federal health care purchasing experiences in light of the 
national evolution to managed health care. Particular attention is paid to system design and 
beneficiary and provider perspectives, as TRIG ARE attempts the impossible of straddling 
between being a discretionary budget program and earned entitlement, seeking to expand access 
and choice despite the goal of cost containment, and hoping to capitalize on market principles 
notwithstanding heavy government regulation. 
In order to provide a foundation upon which to explore the Department of Defense's 
transformation to managed care. Part II focuses on the military health care system's historical 
framework, to include the beginnings of direct and purchased care. Particular attention will be 
paid to the challenge of sustaining the military health care system's dual missions of providing 
peacetime care and wartime readiness, as this will lay the foundation for the vast majority of the 
challenges and demands for customization that arise in the Department of Defense's managed 
care system and eliminate the FEHBP as a possible model for the military. 
Part III discusses the rise of TRICARE as a reflection of the national transformation to 
managed health care in the United States. TRICARE, modeled on civilian managed care 
organizations - including health maintenance organizations (HMOs), preferred provider 
organizations (PPOs) and fee-for-service options, greatly expands the Department of Defense's 
traditional indemnity medical benefit known as the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the 
Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). This section chronicles the legislative origins, design and 
implementation of TRICARE. 
Part IV analyzes the experiences of the Department of Defense as it tried to make this 
transition to a hybrid system that combined an embedded health care structure with market 
purchasing principles and the challenges that arose. This section examines the added 
complexities of a special beneficiary class, heavy federal regulation, and the major barriers to 
full market participation that result from the military health care system's unique design. A brief 
exploration of the similarities and differences in Department of Defense's military health care 
system and other federal purchasing models is instructive when considering future reforms in the 
defense health program and federal purchase of managed care. 
Finally, Part V evaluates current efforts at TRICARE reform through a health care market 
lens and raises further issues to be considered by the Department of Defense and Congress as the 
defense health program continues to mature and the nation seeks to control rising health care 
costs in the continuing transformation to managed care. 
II.      Military Health Care's Historical Framework - The Beginnings of Direct and 
Purchased Care 
The military health care system is unique. The Department of Defense's approach to 
managed care is driven in large measure by the dual missions and historical underpinnings of the 
program. To appreciate the complexity of the current structure, it is necessary to have an 
understanding of the origins and roles of direct and purchased care within this system. 
A. Supplementing Direct Care with Purchased Care (CHAMPUS) 
The Department of Defense maintains its own direct health care system to provide medical 
treatment to active duty military members. In this sense, the direct care system functions like a 
large, government-administered group-practice model health maintenance organization (HMO), 
operating a network of hospitals and facilities and employing health care professionals around 
the world.'° 
Active duty military members are entitled to medical care in any military medical facility. 
Historically, military dependents and retirees were able to receive free medical care at these 
military treatment facilities on a space-available basis.'^ No additional health care coverage was 
' Jonathan P. Weiner and Gregory de Lissovoy, Razing a Tower of Babel: A Taxonomy for Managed Care and 
Health Insurance Plans, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 75, 96 (Summer, 1993) (defining a group-model HMO as 
one which is the sole source of care for enrollees). 
'" Including 75 military hospitals and medical centers, 461 medical clinics, and 131,065 military health system 
personnel. DEP'T OF DEF., EVALUATION OF THE TRICARE PROGRAM FISCAL YEAR 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS 6 
(2003), at http://www.tricare.osd.mil/planning/congress/downloads/ 
TRICARE%20evaluation%20signed%20Apr%203%202003.pdf [hereinafter 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS]. 
" 10 U.S.C.§ 1074(a) (2004). 
'- The furnishing of care is thus discretionary, vice mandatory. See 10 U.S.C. § 1074(b) and § 1076(a),(c) (2004) 
(relevant language tracks that of the Dependents' Medical Care Act, Pub. L. No. 89-569, §§103 and 301, 70 Stat. 
250, 251 and 253 (1956), as originally enacted before codification in Unites State Code, Title 10). For a more 
detailed discussion of pre-1956 authorized health care, see Schism v. U.S., 316 F.3d 1259, 1268-69 (Fed. Cir. 2002), 
cert, denied, 123 S. Ct. 2246 (2003). 
1 ^ provided by the Department of Defense. 
In 1956, Congress expanded military beneficiary health care for spouses and children of 
military members by authorizing government-financing of civilian sector health services as a 
way of supplementing the direct care capability of the military's treatment facilities.    In 1966, 
Congress expanded the scope of medical care benefits available under the program. " 
Additionally, in an effort to assure the availability of health benefits to retirees, the authorization 
for government-financed civilian health services was extended to retirees, their dependents and 
other select beneficiaries as well."' Together, Medicare, enacted in 1965, and the Military 
" It is important to distinguish care provided by the Department of Defense irom that provided by the Department of 
Veterans Affairs. There has been a considerable amount of resource sharing in recent years but a discussion of VA 
care is beyond the scope of this paper. For more information on VA health care in general, see Veterans' Health 
Care Eligibility Refonn Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-262, 110 Stat. 3177 (1996) and the Department of Veterans' 
Affairs Health Benefits webpage arhttp://www.appcl.va.gov/Health_Benefits/. For additional infonnation on 
resource sharing between the departments, see The Final Report of the President's Task Force to Improve Health 
Care Delivery for Our Nation's Veterans: Hearing Before Home Comm. on Veterans'Affairs, 108'*' Cong. (2003) 
(statement of Dr. David S.C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness), at 
http://www.tricare.osd.mil/planning/congress/downloads/2003%20Testimony/061703FInal%20DrChutestimony.pdf 
; DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AND DEP'T OF DEF., DOD/VA HEALTH RESOURCE SHARING AND EMERGENCY 
OPERATIONS ACT FISCAL YEAR 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS (2003), at 
http://www.tricare.osd.mil/planning/congress/downloads/DoD%20VA%20Sharing%20signed% 
20Mar%2027%202003.pdf; STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS, 107™ CONG., DEPARTMENT OF 
VETERANS AFFAIRS AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCE SHARING (Comm. Print 2002), at 
http://veterans.house.gov/about/vadod/vadodsha.pdf; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, VA AND DEFENSE HEALTH CARE - 
EVOLVING HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS REQUIRE RETHINKING OF RESOURCE SHARING STRATEGIES (2000), at 
http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by Report # GAO/HEHS-00-52). 
'* MARY E. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND CORP., PUB. NO. R-4244/6-HA, EVALUATION OF THE CHAMPUS REFORM 
INITIATIVE 3 (1994), ar http://www.rand.Org/publications/R/R4244.6/. See Dependents' Medical Care Act, Pub. L. 
No. 85-569, § 201, 70 Stat. 250, 252 (1956). The contents of this Act were subsequently codified in chapter 55 of 
Title 10 of the United States Code by Pub. L. No. 85-861, 72 Stat. 1437, 1445-51 (1958) (and amended numerous 
times since then). Interestingly, this program was originally referred to as Medicare until the larger Social Security 
Administration program preempted the name. COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., B-133142, SUMMARY REPORT TO 
THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE CIVILIAN 
HEALTH AND MEDICAL PROGRAM OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES, 4 (1971), at http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by 
Decision # B-133142) [hereinafter SUMMARY REPORT]. 
" Available care was expanded from diagnosis, treatment of acute medical and surgical conditions and contagious 
diseases, immunizations, and maternity and infant care to include broad entitlements to hospitalization, outpatient 
care, physical examinations, diagnostic tests and services, mental health treatment, drugs, durable equipment and 
dental care. Military Medical Benefits Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-614, § 2(4), 80 Stat. 862, 863 (1966) 
(codified at 10 U.S.C. §1077). 
"^ § 2(7), 80 Stat. at 865 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §1086). In requesting this authority, the Secretary of Defense 
explained: 
The purpose of the proposed legislation is to provide a program of health benefits equally 
available to all retired members of the uniformed services and their dependents. Such a program 
Medical Benefits Amendment Act of 1966 were designed to provide comprehensive coverage to 
military retirees, with coverage provided through the Department of Defense until Medicare 
eligibility at the age of sixty five. 
The authority permitted the Secretary of Defense to contract for medical care "under such 
insurance, medical service, or health plans as he considers appropriate."    Despite this breadth 
of this authority, the Department of Defense limited its program to one of direct purchasing of 
civilian medical services, vice purchasing full health plans or commercial insurance for its 
beneficiaries. 
The civilian-sourced medical benefits program was redesignated the Civilian Health and 
Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) on January 1, 1967, when the 
amendments became effective.'^ For the next twenty years, the Department of Defense 
supplemented its direct care system with the purchase of health services furnished by civilian 
health care personnel through CHAMPUS' fee-for-service program. This program, in large part, 
mirrored that of other private and public self-insured health care programs by requiring 
participants to share in the costs of care through deductibles and co-pays.'^ The Department of 
Defense, through the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services Office 
(OCHAMPUS), contracted on a cost-reimbursement basis with fiscal agents, including various 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield agencies, insurance companies, and medical societies to process and 
is required to provide equitable benefits to our rapidly increasing retired population. In future 
years, these benefits must increasingly be provided by civilian institutions due to the declining 
coverage of space-available care in military facilities. 
Schism V. U.S., 316 F.3d 1259, 1268-69 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert, denied, 123 S. Ct. 2246 (2003), (quoting from H.R. 
REP. No. 89-1407, at 27 (1966)). 
'^ Military Medical Benefits Amendments of 1966 § 2(6) and (7), 80 Stat. at 863 and 865 (codified as amended at 10 
U.S.C. §1079 and §1086). 
'^ SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 14, at 4. 
'^ ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 4. The Standard CHAMPUS benefits and coverage information is located in the 
first column of Table 1. Id. 
10 
pay virtually all CHAMPUS claims for medical care.^'' In essence, beneficiaries received care 
through a combination of the Department of the Defense's self-administered HMO, known as the 
direct care system, and an added point of service option to receive health care from civilian 
health professionals on a fee-for-service basis under CHAMPUS. 
The provider compensation principles that governed CHAMPUS^' paralleled those used in 
civilian insurance programs,^^ including Medicare. Similarly to the early experiences of 
Medicare,^^ charges for "selected medical procedures ... increased as much as 70 percent in 
some [sjtates."^"* 
B. The Rising Cost of Purchased Care 
As early as 1969, substantial increases in CHAMPUS costs had raised concerns in Congress 
and the Comptroller General of the United States was asked to conduct a review. ^ The 
comprehensive review confirmed costs had risen from $33 million at the start of the program in 
fiscal year 1957 to over $237 million in fiscal year 1970.^^ The increases were due to a 
combination of the 1966 expansion of benefits and eligible beneficiaries, increased costs of 
medical care in general, and increased use of the program.^' Increased usage of the program was 
-° SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 14, at 6. 
-' CHAMPUS adopted the "reasonable-charge" concept for paying physicians for CHAMPUS claims. SUMMARY 
REPORT, supra note 14, at 18 ("a physician receives his customary charge for each service rendered, as long as it is 
within the prevailing level of charges made for the service by other physicians in the same locality"). 
22 See Weiner & Lissovoy, supra note 9, at 76: 
At the onset of the decade ... [a]bout 90 percent of working Americans and their dependents were 
covered by conventional "indemnity" health insurance plans ... consumers were free to choose 
any available provider. Physicians ... were faced with few constraints and practiced more or less 
as they wished. Insurance companies usually served as passive go-betweens ... [w]ith little 
scrutiny they paid bills submitted to them on a fee-for-service (FFS), retrospective basis. 
-' See RAND E. ROSENBLATT, SYLVIA A. LAW & SARA ROSENBAUM, LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM 513-15 (1997). 
^^ SUMMARY REPORT, 5Wjo/-a note 14, at 19. 
"' Letter from Representative George H. Mahon, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of 
Representatives, to the Honorable Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States (Oct. 20, 1969), 
reprinted in SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 14, at 57-58. 
"* SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 14, at 1. 
"W. at2. 
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due in part to staff shortages at military hospitals and treatment facilities which necessitated the 
increased issuance of nonavailability statements'^ and directing of patients away from military 
treatment to more expensive CHAMPUS covered fee-for-service care.'^ 
C. Reduced Capacity in the Direct Care System 
By the late 1970s, the Department of Defense experienced great shortfalls in its ability to 
provide direct medical care at military treatment facilities due to an insufficient number of 
military physicians following the end of the draft.^° This shortage, and the Department's 
resulting reduced ability to provide care to qualified beneficiaries, necessitated a reevaluation of 
both the mission and design of the military health care system in an effort to find the optimal mix 
T 1 
of direct and purchased health care. 
D. The Challenge of Sustaining Military Health Care's Dual Missions 
Any discussion concerning health care reform within the military context must begin with an 
examination of the purpose of the military health care system. The Department of Defense is 
tasked with two distinct, yet symbiotic, missions: maintaining wartime/operational readiness and 
providing peacetime health care for military personnel, retirees, and their families.    The 
'* In an effort to prevent the unnecessary use of civilian care when capacity was available in the military's direct 
care program, nonavailability statements were required before dependents of active duty personnel were entitled to 
utilize CHAMPUS benefits. 
-' SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 14, at 39. 
^° For a more detailed discussion, see COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., REPORT TO CONGRESS B-133044, 
MILITARY MEDICINE IS IN TROUBLE: COMPLETE REASSESSMENT NEEDED, i-v and 4-8 (1979) [hereinaiter MILITARY 
MEDICINE IS IN TROUBLE] . 
^' "We [the Department of Defense] concur ... that a severe gap exists between the number of military physicians 
needed and the number available to render care to the beneficiaries of the Military Health Services System, that this 
shortage has had adverse effects on its responsiveness to military beneficiaries, and that there is a need to reevaluate 
the role and structure of the Military Health Services System." Letter from Vemon McKenzie, Principal Depute 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, to Gregory J. Ahart, Director, Human Resources Division, 
General Accounting Office (Jul. 9,1979), reprinted in MILITARY MEDICINE is IN TROUBLE, supra note 30, at 63-64. 
^" The Department of Defense's Health Affairs website currently articulates the mission as follows: "to provide, and 
to maintain readiness to provide, healthcare services and support to members of the Armed Forces during military 
operations. In addition, the Department's healthcare mission provides healthcare services and support to members 
of the Armed Forces, their family members, and others entitled to DoD healthcare." at 
http://www.ha.osd.mil/about/default.cfm. 
12 
military medical departments were originally created to maintain the health and readiness of 
active duty military members and to be prepared to deploy and treat casualties during war and 
other military operations. ^^ For some compelling accounts regarding the diverse capabilities, 
successes and immeasurable value of the wartime readiness of military health care professions, 
one need only look to their most recent service in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
In addition to maintaining active duty medical readiness, the Department of Defense provides 
health care benefits to a large beneficiary population, as a condition of members' service. " This 
peacetime health care mission utilizes the excess capacity in the direct care system and 
supplements it with purchased civilian care. 
" To that end, the Department of Defense has articulated its military medical readiness training policy as follows: 
It is DoD policy that the appropriate training of military medical personnel is the foundation for 
effective force health protection. Training must encompass all aspects of medical support in 
combat, humanitarian, and homeland defense contingencies and military medical personnel must 
be able to provide health services support in all types of environments. 
DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 1322.24, MILITARY READINESS TRAINING, 2 (July 12, 2002), at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/cortes/html/132224.htm. 
^^ See, e.g., Arlo Wagner, Medical Personnel Deploy to Ship: Navy Sends 400 to USNS Comfort, WASH. TIMES, 
March 17,2003, at Bl (reporting an additional 400 Navy medical personnel left the US to join the USNS Comfort, a 
1,000 bed hospital ship, curtently deployed in the Indian Ocean, to bring the ship to a fiill compliment of 1,200 
medical and hospital support members in anticipation of war in Iraq); Jonathan Bor, An Injured Marine Takes Stock 
after Bloody Battle; Aboard USNS Comfort, Healing Gets Under Way, BALTIMORE SUN, March 23, 2003, at 1A 
(covering surgical treatment provided on board the hospital ship to Marines with combat injuries); Richard Beeston, 
Move Over M*A*S*H- this is Hi-Tech C*A*S*H, TIMES (LONDON), November 15, 2003, at 22 (an imbedded 
reporter covers the 21" Combat Support Hospital operating in Balad, Iraq and the fact that many soldiers who would 
have died of combat wounds are now saved by advances in battlefield medicine and rapid treatment in Combat 
Support Hospitals); Neela Banerjee, The Struggle for Iraq: The Wounded; Rebuilding Bodies, and Lives, Maimed by 
War, N.Y. TIMES, November 16, 2003, at 1 (focusing on .treatment of war amputees at Walter Reed Army Medical 
Center in Washington, D.C.); Injured Troops Return from Iraq: New Medic Training Reducing Combat Deaths 
(CNN Newsnight Aaron Brown 22:00 television broadcast, December 24, 2003) (transcript #122400CN.V84) 
(chronicling treatment of injured American soldiers in forward fields hospitals, at Landstuhl Regional Medical 
Center in Germany and those ultimately air lifted back to military hospitals in the United States for further 
treatment); Work of the 28"' Combat Support Hospital in Baghdad (NPR All Things Considered 9:00 ET radio 
broadcast, January 15, 2004) (examining the unit's 10 months of service in Iraq, Irom tent hospitals in the middle of 
the desert to facilities in Baghdad to provide frontline care to combat wounded). All sources cited are at LEXIS, 
News Library, CURNEWS File. See also Force Health Protection and Surveillance Efforts for Service Members 
Deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom: Hearing Before Total Force Subcomm., 
House Comm. on Armed Services, lOS* Cong. (2004) (statement of The Honorable William Winkenwerder, Jr., 
M.D., M.B.A., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and Lieutenant General James B. Peake, M.D., The 
Surgeon General, U.S. Army Commander, U.S. Medical Command) (testifying that medical care is available within 
minutes with a 98 percent survival rate for those wounded in combat). 
^^ These statutorily created benefits are considered critical to military families' quality of life and a powerful 
inducement for military enlistment. 
13 
Policy analysts may wonder why, with two clearly distinct missions, the system would not 
naturally bifurcate into a direct care system for active duty members and a standard system of 
purchased care for other beneficiaries. The answer, in the Department of Defense's view, is that 
the missions are inextricably intertwined.^^ The military direct care system needs volume and 
constancy in order to maintain its readiness capabilities. There is a concern that severing the two 
systems will result in the inability to properly train for wartime operations. As a result, the 
Department of Defense has repeatedly urged that: 
Failure to deal with this relationship [between the wartime/contingency readiness 
mission of the Military Health Services System and the health benefit mission], 
implies the conceptualization of the system into two discrete and separate entities 
leading to analyses and conclusions that ignore the dual mission. Alternative 
proposals which ignore the dual mission can result in the solution of one mission 
problem to the detriment of the other mission."'^ 
Thus, the basic ground rules of system design were set well before the advent of managed 
care. Throughout the transition to managed care, and to the present time for that matter, the 
Department of Defense has remained steadfast in its convictions regarding military facilities' 
active involvement in civilian beneficiary treatment. 
These dual missions are both what makes the military health care system unique, and what 
serves at times to extraordinarily complicate the Department's attempts to migrate to an 
^^ Militaiy Health System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Total Force, House Comm. on Armed Services, 108' 
Cong. (2003) (statement of Dr. William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, MBA, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health 
Affairs)), a/http://www.tricare.osd.mil/planning/congress/downloads/2003 %20Testimony/040303FrNAL%20 
Dr.Winkenwerderstatement%20.pdf [hereinafter Military Health System Hearing 2003]. 
'^ Letter from Vemon McKenzie, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, to Gregory J. 
Ahart, Director, Human Resources Division, General Accounting Office (Jul. 9, 1979), reprinted in MILITARY 
MEDICINE IS IN TROUBLE, supra note 30, at 63-64. See also Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary 
of Defense, to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) 14 (Jan. 20,2004), at 
http://www.ha.osd.mil/policies/2004/tricare_govemance_guidance.pdf (directing execution of the TRICARE 
governance plan to ensure among other things the integration of the direct care system with purchased care). 
^* GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS # GAO/HEHS-98-68, OFFERING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH 
BENEFITS PROGRAM TO DOD BENEFICIARIES, 6 (1998), at http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by Report # GAO/HEHS- 
98-68) [hereinafter OFFERING FEHBP TO DOD] ("DOD officials have stated that retaining sufficient numbers and an 
appropriate mix of patients in the DoD system is critical to recruiting, retaining, and training military physicians and 
support staff for wartime readiness."). 
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integrated system of managed health care, including efforts to convert CHAMPUS much more 
heavily to a system of competitive purchasing of civilian services.''^ Challenges have included 
the appropriate emphasis to be placed on direct versus purchased care, how to allocate limited 
resources amongst them, and ultimately the proper balance between the two to ensure access to 
cost-effective and timely quality medical care, without sacrificing military readiness. 
The transformation of peacetime health care from what was considered a space-available 
benefit to entice enlistment, to a virtual right or entitlement, via enactment of statutory authority 
to provide purchased care, created tension."^" As a result of the increased demand for peacetime 
care, and related pressure to provide that care in-house in order to contain costs, the system has a 
tendency to become skewed away from its primary wartime mission to one focused primarily on 
providing direct peacetime beneficiary care. 
Problems continued well into the 1980s for the military health system. Congressional 
^' See SUSAN D. HOSEK AND GARY CECCHINE, RAND CORP., PUB. NO. MR-1350-OSD, REORGANIZING THE 
MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM: SHOULD THERE BE A JOINT COMMAND? 3 (2001), at 
http://www.rand.org/pubIications/MR/MR1350/. ("Although the two missions complement one another, joint 
production of readiness and benefits involves a complicated set of trade-offs and management challenges."); 
Observations on Proposed Benefit Expansion and Overcoming TRICARE Obstacle : Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Military Personnel, Home Comm. on Armed Sei-vices, 106* Cong. (2000) (statement of Stephen P. Backhus, 
Director, Veterans' Affairs and Military Health Care Issues, Health, Education, and Human Services Division, Gen. 
Accounting Office), 3, at http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by Report # T-HEHS/NSAID-00-129) [hereinafter 
Observations on Proposed Benefit Expansion Hearing] ("It is because of this dual role that DoD is often challenged 
in providing health care"). 
■*" S. REP. NO. 99-331, at 243 (1986). 
"*' See, e.g., id. at 243 (1986) (highlighting the "slow but steady shift in emphasis ... from its primary mission of 
wartime medical care toward becoming a peacetime birth-to-death medical care system for more than 10 million 
beneficiaries, only some 25% of which are active duty military personnel"). 
See also H.R. REP. No. 99-718, at 234 (1986): 
Following the Vietnam war, the dual missions of military medicine received decidedly unequal 
emphasis. Specifically, the services devoted far more attention to the peacetime benefit missions - 
to the detriment of wartime medical readiness. Rather than using scarce medical resources to 
acquire surgeons in critical wartime specialties, for example, the services accessed, trained, and 
retained a disproportionate number of family-oriented physicians. As a result, the Army today has 
only 41 percent of its wartime need for orthopedic surgeons but 5,409 percent of the pediatricians 
required for war. 
See also H.R. REP. No. 100-58, at 207 (1987) (complaining a insufficient emphasis has been placed on 
medical readiness since the end of the Vietnam conflict and describing "medical manpower shortages as 
serious 'war-stoppers'"). 
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scrutiny concluded the Department of Defense was failing in the performance of both missions. 
The Department of Defense was faced with the failure of their direct care system coupled with 
skyrocketing costs of CHAMPUS, which was consistent with what was occurring nationally at 
the time in fee-for-service plans. 
This predicament highlighted the need to transform the military health care system and led to 
a search for solutions as the nation also confronted the need for health care reform. While 
various public and private models existed, true health care reform on a large scale did not occur 
until the 1980s.'*'' Managed care arose as a "collective response on the part of both public and 
private payers to mounting evidence of out-of-control health care costs which threatened the 
future of health insurance, as well as studies showing widespread evidence of expensive care of 
questionable quality."'*' 
III.     TRICARE - The Customized Development of Managed Care Options within the 
Department of Defense 
"- See H.R. REP. NO. 99-718 at 234 (1986): 
The committee is extremely concerned about the current state of the military medical care system. 
As part of its oversight responsibility, the committee conducted an extensive review of military 
medicine over the last several years in an effort to evaluate whether the military medical care 
system is capable of effectively executing its dual mission .... Unfortunately, the committee has 
concluded that the system is currently incapable of performing either mission adequately. 
Similarly, the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services concluded: 
In short, the committee has little doubt that the present military medical system is not working 
well. At the same time, the committee does not believe this is the fault of the men and women 
who labor in that system. Rather, the system merely was not planned, designed, or constructed to 
provide efficiently the care now required hy the military beneficiary population. 
S. REP. NO. 99-331, at 243-44 (1986) (emphasis added). 
*'' Drew E. Altman and Larry Levitt, The Sad History of Health Care Cost Containment as Told in One Chart, 
HEALTH AFFAIRS (January 23, 2002), at 
http://www.kaisemetwork.org/health_cast/upload_files/AltmanLevittHealthAffairsArticle.pdf (web exclusive). 
^ Weiner & Lissovoy, supra note 9, at 76. 
"^ ROSENBLATT, supra note 23, at 546. 
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In many ways, the impetus for transformation of the military health care system mirrors that 
of the public and private sector, driven in large measure by concerns over escalating costs and 
access to quality health care. The approach taken, however, is a complex and highly customized 
one. The very duality of the Department of Defense health mission and the need to maintain 
extensive facilities and health care personnel in a permanent readiness status created a situation 
that made transformation to a competitive model difficult. 
A. Other Federal Purchasing Models 
Managed care models gained popularity not only in the private insurance industry but in 
federal and state programs as well, including Medicare, Medicaid and the Federal Employees 
Health Benefit Plan (FEHBP). Despite the fact that three federal programs, CHAMPUS, the 
FEHBP, "^^ and Medicare'*'' were all enacted within several years of each other, and were 
patterned after the traditional fee-for-service health benefit model, they evolved rather 
independently over the ensuing decades as health care costs rose and managed care principles 
took hold. One need only take a cursory look at these three systems to notice their diversity in 
structure and design of federally financed health care for their respective beneficiary 
populations. 
Medicare, the nation's largest health insurance program, is a heavily regulated entitlement 
program"*^ that provides an absolute guarantee of health care coverage to beneficiaries who are 
'"' FEHBP was created in 1959 to provide federal employees with comprehensive health care benefits. Pub. L. No. 
86-382, 73 Stat. 708 (1959). 
''^ Medicare was enacted in 1965. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. Title XVIII). 
"' GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-23 1R, COMPARISON OF FEDERAL HEALTH PROGRAMS (1998), at 
http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by Report # HEHS-98-23IR) [hereinafter COMPARISON DP FEDERAL HEALTH 
PROGRAMS]. 
'*' See id. at 12 (comparing the number of statutory and regulatory pages for Medicare, FEHBP and DoD). For a 
more detailed discussion of Medicare regulation and preemption issues, see Michael J. Jackonis, Considerations in 
Medicare Reform: The Impact of Medicare Preemption on State Laws, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 179 (2004). 
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65 or older, disabled, or have end-stage renal disease. ^'^ Sometimes described as an egalitarian 
system, Medicare benefits are heavily subsidized by the federal government and distributed 
primarily based on need vice ability to pay or anticipated risk.''' Operating largely as a fee-for- 
service model, with the federal government acting as a traditional insurer for beneficiaries, 
reimbursing private providers who provide statutorily covered benefits, the government has had 
difficulty constraining costs.' 
Medicare's transition to managed care has lagged behind that of other federal programs and 
private employer-sponsored health care. By 1997, only 15 percent of beneficiaries were enrolled 
in an HMO.^"' Additional health plan options were provided to Medicare beneficiaries in 1999, 
when Medicare+Choice (M+C) began providing beneficiaries with a choice of enrolling in 
private health plans as an alternative to traditional Medicare fee-for-service.^"* Beneficiaries 
were enticed to enroll based on the promise of enhanced benefits, such as coverage of 
prescription drugs and other benefits not covered by traditional Medicare. Medicare's managed 
care program, M+C, has suffered its share of problems,^^ however, and health plans have become 
^'*42U.S.C. §§1395c, 1395J (2004). 
^' ROSENBLATT, supra note 23, at 374. 
^^ E.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, Perspectives on Medicare; Demagoguery and Debate Over Medicare Reform, HEALTH 
AFFAIRS, Winter 1995, at 101 (discussing what have been labeled as "serious design flaws" in Medicare: "it is an 
open-ended, defined-benefit program whose cost can be controlled only by capping the fees paid by the program. 
There is no practical means of controlling the volume of services billed to the program."). 
" COMPARISON OF FEDERAL HEALTH PROGRAMS, supra note 48, at 3-4. 
'■^ Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997). 
^' E.g. Barbara S. Cooper, The Commonwealth Fund, Medicare's Future: Current Picture, Trends, and Medicare 
Prescription Drug Improvement & Modernization Act of 2003 24 (2004), at 
http://www.cmwf.org/programs/medfutur/medicarehtpk_debate_659.pdf: highlighting what are perceived as M+C 
failures: 
• Private plans do not participate in many states and geographic areas 
• Wide geographic variability in premiums and benefits 
• Unstable participation by private plans and providers 
• High out-of-pocket burden on sick 
• No standard benefit; impossible to compare plan benefits 
Id at 25. 
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less willing to participate in M+C.'^''   With the enactment of the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003,^^ it remains to be seen whether a market will 
emerge for private retirement health care plans under Medicare Advantage." 
By contrast, the Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan, a premium support model, is cited 
as a model of success and basis for federal health care reform proposals.^^ Under this model, the 
government acts as an insurance purchaser vice insurer and thus in many ways mirrors private 
employers. The Office of Personnel Management contracts annually with private health 
insurance carriers to provide coverage to federal employees.^'^ All qualified carriers are eligible 
to participate in FEHBP. Under this program, "[t]he government relies heavily on market 
competition and consumer choice to provide [its] members with comprehensive, affordable 
health care."^' The underlying premise of managed competition is to provide beneficiaries with 
the freedom to choose between a range of health care plan options, "in an environment that 
manages the selection process and makes individuals pay for the differences in price among the 
insurance options they choose."^^ Beneficiaries, in turn, can exercise freedom of choice with 
some appreciation of the relative costs. 
^^ Jackonis, supra note 49, at 190-92. Enrollment in M+C peaked at 6.3 million in 1999. JENNIFER STUBER ET AL., 
CTR. FOR HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH AND POLICY, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. MED. CTR., NATIONAL AND LOCAL 
FACTORS DRIVING HEALTH PLAN WITHDRAWALS FROM MEDICARE+CHOICE V (2001), at http://www:cmwf.org. 
Enrollment has declined substantially since that point in time as health plans have terminated their contracts and 
reduced their service areas. Cooper, supra note 55, at 24 (indicating enrollment has dropped from 16% in 1999 to 
11% in 2003). 
" Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
'* Jackonis, supra note 49, at 230. 
^' Stuart M. Butler and Robert E. Moffit, Medicare Analysis: The FEHBP as a Model for a New Medicare Program, 
HEALTH AFFAIRS (Winter 1995). 
^^ OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, FEHBP HANDBOOK (Aug. 22,2003), at 
http://www.opm.gov/insure/handbook/fehbOO.asp. 
*' Purchasing Health Care Services in a Competitive Environment: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 
108* Cong. 1 (2003) (statement of Abby L. Block, Senior Advisor for Employee and Family Policy, Office of 
Personnel Management), a? http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing040303.htm (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
Senate Finance Hearing]. 
*" Mark A. Hall, supra note 4. 
*^ "Empirical research on the design of health insurance plans has shown that people who face few out-of-pocket 
costs tend to use more medical care than those who pay even modest copayments for their care." CONG. BUDGET 
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All FEHBP plans "offer a core set of benefits broadly outlined in statute," but "benefits vary 
among plans because there is no standard benefits package."^"* This structure provides plans with 
broad flexibility, encourages innovation and thereby capitalizes on private sector initiatives.    In 
many ways a comparison of Medicare and FEHBP highlight the contrasting characteristics of 
heavy regulation versus deregulation/free market principles and egalitarianism versus 
consumerism. 
As the Department of Defense sought to transition to managed care, the FEHBP, which 
possessed roughly the same number of beneficiaries as the military health care system, provided 
a successful, universally recognized model in the form of a relatively passive federal purchaser 
of employee health care. Nonetheless, the Department of Defense rejected this model in the 
establishment of TRIG ARE, instead staking out a different, customized pathway for itself 
B. The Origins of TRICARE - Major Demonstration Projects 
In the mid-1980s, as a result of dramatic increases in CHAMPUS costs, the Department of 
Defense and Congress sought to explore ways of redesigning the military health care system to 
make it more efficient. ^^ Congress provided the Secretary of Defense with Title 10 authority to 
"conduct studies and demonstration projects on the health care delivery system of the uniformed 
services with a view to improving the quality, efficiency, convenience, and cost-effectiveness of 
providing health care services."^' Consequently, as civilian employers and the nation as a whole 
were exploring ways to curb rising health care costs, the military was also tasked with exploring 
OFFICE, supra note 6, at 16. See also JEANNE S. RiNGEL ET. AL, RAND CORP, THE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR 
HEALTH CARE - A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM (2002), 
available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MRl355/MRl 355.pdf. 
*''' Senate Finance Hearing, supra note 61, at 2 (statement of Abby L. Block, Senior Advisor for Employee and 
Family Policy, Office of Personnel Management) ("While the program has a statutory and regulatory framework, 
key aspects of plan design, such as coverage or exclusion of certain services and benefit levels are in neither law nor 
regulation"). 
*'Wat3. 
^ H.R. REP. No. 99-718, at 237 (1986). 
" 10 U.S.C. § 1092(a)(1) (2004) (added by Pub. L. No. 98-94, §933(a)(l), 97 Stat. 650 (1983)). 
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alternative methods of payment for health care services,^^ beneficiary cost-sharing,   innovative 
approaches to delivery and financing of health care^° and prepayment for services. 
1986 proved to be a significant year in the history of military health care as what were 
considered to be major improvements and reforms were contemplated and statutory authority 
enacted. Three significant revisions were addressed during the annual national defense 
authorization act cycle for fiscal year 1987: the need for better integration of direct and 
purchased care, the establishment of a health care enrollment system, and an initiative to reform 
the CHAMPUS fee-for-service system into a hybrid system of managed care. 
The first effort sought to better integrate the Department's direct care system with 
CHAMPUS. Up until this point in time, with the exception of requiring some beneficiaries to 
obtain authorization prior to nonemergency inpatient hospitalization outside the direct care 
system,^^ beneficiaries were free to choose between direct and fee-for-service care and to move 
back and forth between the two.^"* Additionally, because the two systems were fragmented when 
it came to budgeting,'^ there was no accountability for the military treatment facilities to 
maximize direct care in favor of the more expensive CHAMPUS care, even when nonavailability 
statements were required.^^ As a resuh, CHAMPUS claims surged and the Department 
^^ lOU.S.C. § 1092(a)(1)(A) (2004). 
"' 10 U.S.C. § 1092(a)( 1 )(B) (2004). 
™ 10 U.S.C. § 1092(a)(1)(D) (2004). Across the nation, reform efforts in both the public and private sectors were 
focused on some form of integration between the financing and provision of health care. Sara Rosenbaum and Brian 
Kamoie, Managed Care and Public Health: Conflict and Collaboration, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 191, 192 (2000); 
Weiner & Lissovoy, supra note 9, at 85-86. 
'' 10 U.S.C. § 1092(a)(1)(F) (2004). 
'^l H.R. REP.NO. 99-718, at 237-243 (1986). 
'' Authorization consisted of nonavailability statements, indicating the requested medical services were not available 
within the direct care system, either due to lack of space available, resources or required expertise. 
''*SeeH.R. REP. No. 99-718, at 246 (1986). 
" CHAMPUS payments were financed centrally through the Department of Defense while the military services 
individually financed the operation and maintenance of their own military treatment facilities. 
'^ As the House Armed Services Committee observed, "Why should the services try to use military treatment 
facilities more fully, thereby absorbing more expensive CHAMPUS workload, when they are not accountable for 
those CHAMPUS dollars? Indeed, the present budgetary set-up encourages the services to shift patients out of 
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experienced significant budget shortfalls'^ Through the creation of a Military Health Care 
Account, Congress sought to make the first step towards integrating direct and purchased care 
through financing'^ Through this new account, the Secretary of Defense would allot to each 
service funding believed necessary to meet their CHAMPUS expenses. 
Using their operation and maintenance appropriation for the direct care system 
and their allotment from the transfer account, the services would be responsible 
for providing all medical care to their beneficiary population [including 
CHAMPUS costs] and would have to seek to reprogram funds appropriated for 
other programs to make up any shortfall. 
The significance of this was not so much in the specific nature of the revision pursued, as this 
has subsequently changed, as it was the recognition of the inherent flaw in the system's current 
structure and questionable incentives. Specifically, the lack of integrated funding between direct 
and purchased care, frequently resulted in a less than optimal utilization of direct care capacity at 
the expense of purchased care. Failure to incrementally increase funding for the arguably 
underfinanced and understaffed direct care system in order to maximize direct care capacity, 
resulted in an exponential increase in purchased care expenses to the overall detriment to the 
defense health program. ^° 
direct care, with little regard for CHAMPUS expenses." H.R. REP. NO. 99-718, at 238. In essence, military 
treatment facilities were free to engage in adverse selection and had no incentive to provide less costly care by 
contracting for additional staff in military hospitals, since any such effort would impact the facilities' budgets but 
referral to the more costly CHAMPUS would not. 
" Id. (citing a 19% increase in CHAMPUS claims for inpatient care within the military hospital catchment area 
[roughly a 40-mile radius] in the first half of fiscal year 1986 alone while CHAMPUS claims outside the catchment 
area remained stable). 
'* National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3816, 3896-97 (codified 
at 10 U.S.C. § 1100) (1986) (10 U.S.C. § 1100 has been significantly amended subsequently). See also H.R. REP. 
No. 99-718, at 239 ("This situation will only change if the services program fiinds for direct care and CHAMPUS in 
unison."). 
'■' H.R. REP. 99-1001, at 488 (1986). 
*" See, e.g., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-90-] 31, DEFENSE HEALTH CARE: POTENTIAL FOR SAVINGS BY 
TREATING CHAMPUS PATIENTS IN MILITARY HOSPITALS - REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOM. ON MILITARY 
PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION. HOUSE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES (1990), at http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by 
Report # GAO/HRD-90-131) (discussing the potential savings from adding staff and other resources to military 
freatment facilities in order to treat more patients with direct rather than purchased care). 
22 
A second major flaw in the current system structure was the inabihty to accurately define 
the beneficiary population.^' This flaw was a clear impediment to the more efficient provision of 
medical services in both the direct and purchased care systems. Without this data, there was no 
way to accurately determine the number of covered lives and the amount of financial risk a risk 
bearing entity would be subjected to.^^ As a result, legislation was enacted directing the 
Secretary of Defense to establish an enrollment system for health care beneficiaries. 
Finally, the third and most significant system reform involved CHAMPUS. The 
Department of Defense fashioned a sweeping reform measure which would transition the 
CHAMPUS program from one of self-insurance into the realm of managed care.    The 
Department further sought to consolidate its "widely dispersed, buying power ... to strike more 
favorable deals." " 
1. CHAMPUS Reform Initiative (CRI) 
a. Structure and Design 
*' As the United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services recognized: 
The Defense Department lacks adequate information on both the size and demographic 
characteristics of its beneficiary population. Unlilce private insurers, who usually underwrite 
contracts on the basis of a defined beneficiary population, military treatment facilities do not know 
the true size of the patient population that they serve. Currently, beneficiaries flow between 
CHAMPUS and direct care virtually at will; the managers of both systems are unable to budget 
with any certainty for a specified beneficiary population due to the lack of data available. 
This lack of certainty creates substantial disruption for beneficiaries as well; they do not know 
from one visit to another, first, whether specific types of care will be available at the military 
hospital, and second, if available, how long the wait for that care will be. It is a no-win situation 
for all concerned. 
H.R. REP. NO. 99-718, at 239-40 (1986). 
82 See Weiner & Lissovoy, supra note 9, at 82-84 (discussing at length the role of financial risk m managed 
care). 
*' See 10 U.S.C. § 1099 (2003). Upon enactment in 1986, however, initial implementation, and thus the effective 
dates of various provisions in 10. U.S.C. § 1099, were phased in over a number of years. Nafional Defense 
Authorizafion Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661, § 701(d)(1) and (2), 100 Stat. 3816, 3898 (1986). 
** H.R. REP. NO. 99-718, at 237 (1986). 
*^ H.R. REP. NO. 100-58, at 219-20 (1987). 
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The Department of Defense first envisioned this reform, named "Project Imprint", would 
"replace CHAMPUS with three regional contractors - and perhaps, ultimately with a single, 
nationwide contractor - who would be at financial risk for all care not provided in military 
medical facilities."^^ The concept was designed to replace the Department's fee-for-service 
CHAMPUS with regional contractors who would assume ultimate responsibiUty for providing 
care at a fixed cost to dependents and retirees, by utilizing a combination of military and civilian 
care. As in any managed care plan, beneficiaries would be offered incentives, in the form of 
reduced cost sharing, if they utilized the less expensive specified provider network that offered 
discounted services under the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative. 
The Department of Defense's objectives included: containing CHAMPUS costs, increasing 
access to care, improving coordination between the direct and purchased care systems, assuring 
quality of care, and simplifying administrative procedures.^^ In order to achieve those 
objectives, the Department of Defense envisioned the following: 
- competitive fixed-price contracts awarded to private sector health care 
providers to help contain costs; 
- a voluntary enrollment system, called CHAMPUS Prime, to improve 
beneficiary access to care and simplify CHAMPUS administrative 
procedures; 
- a health care finder mechanism to improve coordination between 
CHAMPUS, military treatment facilities and beneficiaries; 
- quality assurance standards that must be adhered to by contractors; and 
- staff-sharing agreements whereby contractor staff would augment staff in 
military treatment facilities.^^ 
*^ H.R. REP. No. 99-718, at 237. 
*' CHAMPUS Reform Initiative Unresolved Issues: Hearing Before the Siibcomni. on Manpower and Personnel, 
Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 100* Cong. (1987) (statement of David P. Baine, Director, Federal Health Care 
Delivery Issues, Human Resources Division, Gen. Accounting Office), 2, ar http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by 
Report # GAO/T-HRD-87-5) [hereinafter CRI Unresolved Issues Hearing]. 
'Udatl. 
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What the Department sought was a customized managed heahh care program designed to 
both utiHze and supplement the existing direct care system. The majority of care would continue 
to be provided through the direct care system, with the continued availability of fee-for-service 
CHAMPUS benefits and the option of voluntary participation in the managed-care plans. Under 
the managed care option, contractors would negotiate for discounted private sector care to deal 
with the overflow from the direct care system. 
For a number of reasons, what the Department of Defense sought to create and what they 
eventually produced differed in both magnitude and design. First, Congress, concerned with the 
sheer magnitude of this transformation,^^ authorized the Department to proceed with a smaller 
CHAMPUS Reform Initiative (CRI) demonstration project to determine the feasibility of 
phasing in such an approach nationally. 
Comments were then solicited from industry on the Department's draft request for proposals. 
General industry apprehensions included "the inability to adequately define a beneficiary 
population" and concerns over "adverse selection."^' Additional concerns expressed included 
the "excessive, overly restrictive, duplicative, and unclear" administrative requirements; 
"reservations about coordination of activities between the contractor and the military treatment 
facilities"; and that the coordination would be "difficult to achieve due to the issue of control and 
*' See H.R. REP. NO. 99-718, at 238 (1986), where the Committee on Armed Services wrote: 
The goals of the CHAMPUS reform initiative are laudable. That the Departinent of Defense 
should seek the best buy on good quality medical care for its beneficiary population is obvious. 
But the very magnitude of the changes entailed gives the committee cause for concern ... Does 
the military health care system have the expertise to write, execute, and oversee three large 
contracts on a nationwide basis? If the answer is anything other than unequivocally in the 
affirmative, the impact on beneficiaries could be detrimental, (emphasis added). 
'" National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, PUB. L. No. 99-661, § 702, 100 Stat. 3816, 3899 
(1986). 
^' S. REP.NO. 99-331, at 245 (1986). The fear of adverse selection in this case being the shifting of high-risk, costly 
patients from direct care to the contractor's responsibility under purchased care while less expensive patients remain 
in direct care. 
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the complexity of the requirements."^^ The Department of Defense did attempt to address "many 
of the concerns raised by industry respondents ... by permitting offerers more flexibility in 
designing systems to meet new program features" and adjusting the risk-sharing provisions. 
As the Department prepared to proceed. Congress expressed^"* additional concerns regarding 
the element of competition and size of the regions, recommending a smaller regional design 
more in line with the approach of private sector employers.^"' Notwithstanding these 
Congressional recommendations, the Department proceeded with plans to award separate 
contracts in three two-state areas: Florida and Georgia, North and South Carolina, and California 
and Hawaii, all areas where the direct care system was overcrowded, resulting in high 
CHAMPUS volume and very high costs.^^ 
Despite the revised request for proposals, consortia of insurance companies and managed 
care corporations pulled out in two of the three regions, citing "DoD's demanding design and 
'' CR] Unresolved Issues Hearing, supra note 87, at 7. 
'■' Id. at 8. The House Anned Services Committee noted tlie precarious position tlie Department of Defense was in 
when it opined: 
Uncertainty about costs amplifies the rislcs to potential bidders. The department proposes to 
minimize risk by offering contractors retrospective and prospective opportunities for adjusting 
their otherwise fixed prices. If successful from the contractors' point of view, these adjustments 
may simply transfer the cost risk back to the government. If contractors still view CRI as too 
risky, they may submit high bids. In either case, the success of the CHAMPUS Refonn Initiative 
hangs in jeopardy. 
H. REP. NO. 100-58, at 220 (1987). 
94 Observers would now say somewhat prophetically. 
'^ In the words of the House Armed Services Committee: 
Competition is supposed to be an essential element of the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative. The 
committee is concerned that this may not be the case, however. Although the size of the current 
two-state regions is better than the department originally proposed - namely, dividing the country 
into thirds - these are still very large areas .... Only a limited number of contractors have the 
capability to cover such a large area; quality of care could be jeopardized. In addition, many firms 
may be unwilling to assume risks for a multi-state area .... Considerable concern also exists that 
only one bidder may have the capability to provide care in a two-state region .... By contrast, 
employers in the private sector tend to contract on a much smaller basis - with the local Blue 
Cross-Blue Shield Plan or an area health maintenance organization or a city-wide network of 
providers. In the interest of furthering competition, the committee, therefore, recommends the 
issuance of a new solicitation for Phase I of CRI that reconfigures the contracts to smaller areas. 
H. REP. NO. 100-58, at 222 (1987). 
'^ CRI Unresolved Issues Hearing, supra note 87, at 2. 
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performance requirements coupled with a fixed-price contract."''^ Only one bidder believed the 
risk could be manageable and submitted the lone bid in response to the Department's request for 
proposals.^^ Additionally, prior to contract award for the California/Hawaii area, extensive 
negotiations, "focused on lowering the risk to the contractor through complex formulas that 
provided for sharing both potential profits and losses,"^^ were required with the bidder. 
Foundation Healthcare Corporation, a first-time contractor with the Department of Defense. The 
complex risk-sharing formula capped the contractor's cumulative loss at less than one percent of 
one year's bid price. "^^ With such a small risk corridor, the contract resembled that of a third- 
party administrator and was virtually an administrative services only (ASO) vice risk contract. 
While no longer a "truly capitated contracf, the parties nonetheless believed that the risk-sharing 
provisions would provide many of the same incentives. 
b. CRI Implementation - Panacea or Pandemonium? 
Foundation Health Corporation was provided with a six-month development phase prior to 
implementing a comprehensive system of health care delivery services for all eligible 
CHAMPUS beneficiaries in this two state, geographically separated region in August of 1988 - 
nothing short of a colossal undertaking.'*^^ Foundation quickly developed a network of 
established sub-contractors.'°^ Despite the fact that the subcontractors' existing networks and 
'"^ ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 6. 
'* Implementation of the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Manpower and Personnel, 
Senate Comm. on Armed Services, lOl" Cong. (1989) (statement of David P. Baine, Director, Federal Health Care 
Delivery Issues, Human Resources Division, Gen. Accounting Office), 2, a? http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by 
Report # T-HRD-89-25) [hereinafter CRI Implementation Hearing]. 




103 Subcontractors included: 
-    Foundation Health Plan, a subsidiary, which operated a series of independent practice associations (IPAs) 
primarily in western states. Foundation Health Plan was to manage the CHAMPUS Program for Northern 
California. 
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experience could be used as building blocks, significant customization was still required 
including expanding networks into areas not previously covered, incorporating the military's 
fixed internal delivery system into the provider network, catering to a highly mobile user 
population, and learning to work with a self-insuring entity that had always done business in a 
command and control way rather than the unregulated market in which managed care companies 
were used to operating. The establishment and maintenance of provider networks proved 
challenging in the initial years of CRI implementation in Hawaii and California. 
A total of three options were provided to beneficiaries. In addition to the standard 
CHAMPUS fee for service option, beneficiaries were also offered CHAMPUS Prime, an 
enrolled program where beneficiaries would receive all civilian-provided care through a 
contractor-established provider network at little cost, and CHAMPUS Extra, which simply 
offered beneficiaries, whether or not enrolled, the option of obtaining reduced cost care through 
the contractor network.'^'' 
In order to support these plan options, the contractor and subcontractors were required to 
assemble groups of physicians, other providers and hospitals who would agree to treat 
beneficiaries at a reduced fee and comply with the Department of Defense's contract 
requirements including direct claims submissions on behalf of patients and submitting to medical 
- Partners Health Plan, which developed and managed HMOs, PPOs, and other health care products, would 
manage the program for Southern California. 
- Queen's Health Plan, a nonprofit corporation owned by a medical center and other providers in Hawaii, 
was the subcontractor for that state. 
Blue Cross of Washington and Alaska was the subcontract fiscal intermediary to process standard 
CHAMPUS claims. Foundation was responsible for processing claims under the new managed-care 
options. 
Mat 7. 
'"^W. at 16-17. 
'"^ Potential Expansion of the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel 
and Compensation, House Comm. on Armed Services, 101*'Cong., 3-4 (1990) (statement of David P. Baine, 
Director, Federal Health Care Delivery Issues, Human Resources Division, Gen. Accounting Office), at 
http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by Report #GAO/T-HRD-90-17). 
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practice and credential review.'"^ Foundation and its subcontractors used a variety of strategies 
in their initial network development. Building on their preexisting commercial networks, they 
sought to recruit additional providers through joint ventures they had previously established and 
they utilized prior CHAMPUS claims data from Blue Cross where available to target providers 
who filed the largest number of claims. '°^ 
Almost one year after implementation, Congress characterized the project as one "fraught 
with administrative and financial problems" and cautioned the Department of Defense to 
carefully consider whether to exercise the remaining options on the contract. "^^ When examined 
through the lens of managed care reform, many of the problems that were experienced during the 
implementation of the CRI could have been, and in fact to some degree were predictable. The 
geneses for these problems can be subdivided into several interrelated categories - the degree of 
customization demanded, and the lack of experience in this sort of venture, both on the part of 
the contractor and the Department, further compounded by a short implementation period. 
Most notably, despite the Department's goal of obtaining regional risk bearing entities, 
minimal interest was expressed and reduced risk sharing on the part of the contractor was 
necessitated by both the customized nature of the system and lack of good data on the 
beneficiary population. Contractor inexperience with the military also led to problems. During 
the initial contract term, the Department of Defense "expressed frustration over Foundation's 
lack of responsiveness to demands for contract compliance.""^   Furthermore, concerns over the 
financial condition of Foundation required contract modification to incorporate additional 
safeguards in the form of segregated escrow accounts and Department approval for fiind release 
""^ ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 14. 
'"Vc/. at 15-16. 
'"*H.R.REP.NO. 101-121, at 302-03 (1989). 
'*" CRI Implementation Hearing, supra note 98, at 8. 
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to ensure protection of government funds. 
Moreover, the contractor experienced some problems in developing and maintaining the 
network - some challenges attributable to managed care in general compounded exponentially 
by the unique design and requirements of the Department of Defense, coupled with an 
inadequate implementation period. For example, in two-thirds of the military treatment facility 
services areas, Prime was not available until nine months after the implementation phase was to 
have concluded.''' Additionally, some providers refused to join the network when they 
discovered Foundation was obligated to maximize the use of military treatment facilities first and 
that Foundation would not be working directly for the provider.''^ There were gaps in coverage 
1   1 T 
as well as Foundation struggled to acquire providers in certain remote areas.      The contractors 
also experienced significant erosion of their preexisting networks as providers withdrew due to 
the lower fee schedule and dissatisfaction with the military managed care program, particularly 
claims processing.'' 
Claims processing quickly became the Achilles heel of the system, and threatened the very 
continuation of the government contract.""' Claims processing, enrollment and beneficiary 
tracking proved to be too much for Foundation's computer system.^'^ Less than ten months into 
the contract, Foundation had over 214,000 unprocessed claims, seventy percent of which 
""See H.R. REP.NO. 101-121, at 302-03 (1989); CRIImplementation Hearing, supranote 98, at 11-12. 
'" RAND CORP., RB-4526, RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: INTRODUCING MANAGED CARE IN THE MILITARY HEALTH 
SYSTEM 3 (1999), o/http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB4526/ [hereinafter RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS]. 
"- ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 16. 
"^/J. atl7. 
""Mat 16-17. 
"' CRI Implementation Hearing, supra note 98, at 8 (quoting a DoD site visit report "the Foundation Health 
Corporation's MIS [management information system] support to CRI operations and management [is] deficient in 
every aspect and at every organizational level... unsatisfactory performance in MIS jeopardizes continuation of the 
entire project"). See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-121, at 303 (1989). 
'"^ ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 25. 
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exceeded the contract requirement that all claims be processed within thirty days.      Problems 
escalated with both beneficiaries and providers to the point that Foundation started paying 
providers seventy percent of their historical CHAMPUS-charged bills and then began an 
automatic payment program for all providers where any claim over thirty days old received a 
preliminary payment of seventy to seventy five percent of the actual charges.      These 
unitemized payments further frustrated providers as bookkeeping became impossible. 
Collection actions were also initiated against beneficiaries, much to their dissatisfaction and 
dismay.'^*' The negative impact that resulted from the failures in claims processing were felt 
throughout every aspect of CRI, as resources were redirected to try and solve this problem at the 
expense of other goals and conflicting priorities. 
Some beneficiaries also expressed concern over a perceived erosion of benefits and found the 
new program's protocols confusing.'^^ A number of these concerns can be attributed to the 
introduction of managed care principles in general.'^^ Others were attributable to the rapid 
implementation period and the difficulty in educating such a fluid beneficiary population. These 
initial experiences certainly demonstrate that the Department of Defense's goal of administrative 
simplification and increased beneficiary satisfaction were illusory during the implementation 
phase of the initiative. Additionally, despite the goal of administration simplification, it was 
"' CRI Implementation Hearing, supra note 98, at 6. 
"^ ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 32. 
"'W. at 32-33. 
'^° Mat 32. 
'^' For example, additional full-time staff had to be hired to augment claims work and provider and beneficiary 
relations in order to handle the large number of complaints. Marketing staffs were diverted to assist. Utilization 
review suffered as enforcement was reduced in an effort to prevent further aggravation and loss of providers. 
ANDERSON, 5wpra note 14, at 33. 
'^^Mat23. 
'^^ These concerns would include a loss of choice in providers and the restrictions of tightly managed care. See 
generally Alain C. Enthoven et al., Consumer Choice and the Managed Care Backlash, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 
(2001); Marc A. Rodwin, Backlash as Prelude to Managing Managed Care, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1115 
(1999). 
31 
clear from the start that program complexity would in fact increase.'^"* Furthermore, an 
independent evaluation mandated by Congress revealed that the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative 
actually resulted in an eight percent increase in costs to the government.' ^ 
Despite the problems, the parties were able to glean certain valuable lessons.'^"^ Clearly, both 
the contractor and the government underestimated the complexity of the undertaking as well as 
the time it would take. Had the implementation period been extended, some of these problems 
could have been avoided, or at least minimized. Other problems were inevitable and continue to 
challenge the Department of Defense. 
2. Catchment Area Management (CAM) Initiative 
Concurrently with CRT, a second major alternative health care delivery system was 
1 OH 
conceptualized and implemented.      The program, called Catchment Area Management (CAM), 
sought to systematically address such questions as "Is 'massive buying power' really necessary 
to strike favorable deals with the private sector? Are local medical comniknders truly unable to 
acquire and manage complex new capabilities? Indeed, what is the best level at which to manage 
the military health care system?"'^^ In contrast to the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative, under the 
CAM initiative primary authority rested at the military treatment facility commander level vice a 
regional contractor. Individual military treatment facility commanders would be responsible for 
'^'' See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-87-65BR, DEFENSE HEALTH CARE: CHAMPUS REFORM INITIATIVE: 
UNRESOLVED ISSUES - BRIEFING REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS 17-19(1987). 
'"^ RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 111 (opining that implementation problems may have "hampered its ability 
to control costs"). 
'^^ Id at 3 (citing increased access to care and satisfaction among enrolled beneficiaries once fully operational). See 
also ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 59: 
A military managed-care program like CRl is extraordinarily complex because it must coordinate 
the military and civilian health care systems and accommodate a mobile beneficiary population... 
. Creating satisfactory working relationships among organizations with differing perspectives 
requires considerable effort to establish communication channels, educate all groups about the 
managed-care program, and train staff in the program and the context for its implementation. 
'^^ Ongoing challenges include claims processing and network adequacy. 
'^* National Defense Authorizafion Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180, § 731, 101 Stat. 1019, 
1117(1987). 
'-' H. REP. NO. 100-58, at 222-23 (1987). 
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providing all beneficiary care in their catchment areas, by providing care in their own facilities or 
through other alternative arrangements they w^ould establish.'■'*' Commanders would have the 
ability to choose "any type of health care delivery system, for any scope of coverage" they 
determined appropriate.'^' By allowing local commanders, on a smaller geographic scale, the 
flexibility to acquire and modify resources as needs dictate, this demonstration project is 
arguably much more in line with the practices of the private sector. The goals of CAM mirrored 
those of CRI - constrain the growth of CHAMPUS costs and improve beneficiary satisfaction 
with the military healthcare system. The localization of choice approach taken under CAM 
however, was a mirror image of the CRI philosophy of big block purchasing from private 
companies. 
3. Other Efforts to Reduce Costs and Provide Efficiencies 
In addition to planning for a national transition to managed care, the Department of Defense 
also enlisted other methods to assist in reducing medical expenditures. For example, the military 
purchased care system was paying on average fifty percent higher physician reimbursement rates 
than Medicare.'''^ In 1991, the Department of Defense began reducing the maximum allowable 
charges for civilian physicians down to Medicare levels.''^^ The Department of Defense is now 
statutorily required, with some permissible exceptions in remote areas and to ensure adequate 
numbers and mixes of qualified network physicians, to set their maximum allowable charge 
rates'"^"* using the Medicare fee schedule.'^^ 
'"" National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 § 731(b), 101 Stat. at 1117; H. REP. NO. 
100-58, at 223 (1987). 
''" National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 § 731(b). 
'^- GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS GAO-0 1 -620, ACROSS-THE-BOARD PHYSICIAN RATE 
INCREASE WOULD BE COSTLY AND UNNECESSARY 1 (2001), at http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by Report #GAO-01 - 
620) [hereinafter ACROSS-THE-BOARD PHYSICIAN RATE INCREASE]. 
'"^ Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8012 (1990). Rate reductions were 
capped at a 15% per year. Id. 
'"'' Referred to as the CHAMPUS maximum allowable charge (CMAC). 
33 
The transition to managed care contracts necessitated changes in the way direct care facilities 
were operating as well.'^^ Military treatment facilities were forced to undergo a shift in priorities 
in order to accommodate managed care's primary goal - cost avoidance.'^^ In an effort to better 
mirror civilian practices and capture the financial incentives of managed care, resource allocation 
methods were put into place to serve as the primary criteria for allocation of resources to the 
military treatment facilities.'^^ The blending of direct and purchased care proved to be 
challenging as well as the Department of Defense, individual military services, military treatment 
facility commanders, and contractors has to sort through a variety of command and control 
issues. 
The CRT and CAM demonstration projects and above-mentioned efforts to achieve greater 
cost efficiency are by no means exhaustive. Rather, they are meant to illustrate the breadth of 
the spectrum of options available to the Department of Defense as they sought to develop a 
national managed care plan. 
'^' National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 731, 110 Stat. 186 (1986) 
(codifying what had previously been annual Department of Defense Appropriations Act provisions at 10 U.S.C. § 
1079(h)). 
'^^ Richard K. Bachman, Turning an Organization on its Head (Military Medical Management), 22 PHYSICIAN 
EXECUTIVE 25 (1996), at 1996 WL 9253174: 
Military hospitals are becoming partners in an integrated system as the Department of Defense's 
nationwide managed care contract, TRICARE, is implemented. They are discovering they need to 
be competitive. No longer protected by a steady, reliable fiinding source, they must demonstrate 
relevance in order to survive. This realization has caused a paradigm shitl in military medicine, 
generating new strategies in management and operations. 
'"" Not that such a shift was unique. As managed care principles have taken hold, providers across the country have 
had to face a shift in financial incentives from one of providing more care to one of providing less care, while still 
satisfying their professional obligations. Pegram v. Herdrich, 520 U.S. 211,218-219 (2000). The experience was 
no different for the military as military treatment facilities were faced with these issues for the first time during the 
implementation of the CHAMPUS Refonn Initiative: 
Individuals ... should recognize that military clinicians and administrators have not previously 
had an incentive to reduce costs. Their priorities, aside from an individually rewarding medical 
practice, are access to high-quality medical care for military beneficiaries and the maintenance of 
medical training programs. Proponents of managed care hold that it enhances quality and access 
and can provide a better mix of patients for medical training, but this is not immediately clear to 
the MTF's medical states. Early attention must be given to convincing them that cost avoidance 
does not mean low-quality medicine, reduced access to medical care, or degraded training. 
ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 60. 
'^* 10 U.S.C. §1101 (2004). 
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Regardless of the demonstration project and method for capturing some of the benefits of 
managed care, some basic problems still needed to be fixed within the military health care 
system. First, the military still lacked a comprehensive enrollment system which would be 
essential to both gather beneficiary data and to predict future levels of required services.      They 
also still lacked a budgeting and resource allocation system that could "accurately predict 
resource needs, distribute resources equitably, and give managers the proper incentives to 
achieve the desired health care and budgetary objectives."'"*" Simultaneously, the military was 
struggling with how to control costs and utilization of services through the use of appropriate 
incentives, and whether those incentives should resemble carrots or sticks.      Finally, while 
arguably experienced in government procurement contracting in general, the Department of 
Defense was faced with the daunting and somewhat unfamiliar task of contracting for civilian 
health care services,'''^ during an aggressive period of health reform across the nation no less. 
Both civilian managed-care programs and the military health care system are 
complex operations. Merging them requires detailed planning, personnel with 
appropriate skills and training, the cooperation and support of all facets of the 
[military health care system], education of those charged with carrying out the 
new program, and time for them to test and adjust the processes and procedures of 
the numerous components. Short cuts in any of these areas may prove 
counterproductive to intended goals. 
C. TRICARE 
As employers and the nation as a whole faced rapidly escalating health care costs, the 
military confronted even greater challenges: 
'^' H.R. REP. NO. 101-121, at 301 (1989) (chastising the Department for their slow progress in meeting the 
requirement to phase in a health care enrollment system). 
''"' Obstacles in Implementing Coordinated Care : Hearing Before the Siibcomm. on Military Personnel and 
Compensation, House Comm. on Armed Services, 102"'' Cong. (1992) (statement of David P. Baine, Director of 
Federal Health Care Delivery Issues, Human Resources Division, Gen. Accounting Office), 6, at 
http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by Report # T-HRD-92-24) [hereinafter Obstacles Hearing]. 
'''Mat 2-4. 
'''" Id. at 7 (suggesting a number of factors that should be considered in determining how to maximize the direct care 
system and contract out where it makes the most economic sense). 
'"''' ANDERSON, supra note 14, at vi (emphasis added). 
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The downsizing of the miHtary structure and the growing demand for care from 
nonactive-duty beneficiaries was concurrent with significant growth in health care 
costs. Between 1980 and 1990, DoD health care costs grew by almost 225 
percent, compared to about a 166 percent increase in national health expenditures. 
During this period, the medical portion of the Defense budget doubled, from 3 
percent of the total to 6 percent.''*'* 
Despite the variety of demonstration projects and other cost-containment initiatives the 
Department of Defense sought to incorporate in the late 1980s, health care costs continued to 
escalate rapidly under CHAMPUS."*^ As a result, the Department of Defense developed a plan 
in the early 1990s to implement a nationwide transformation of the military health care system to 
one of managed care, utilizing a combination of features from the two main demonstration 
projects.'"*^ Some went so far as to suggest that the Department of Defense's transition to 
managed care could provide useful information to both public and private sectors: 
As the country moves toward national health care reform, DoD should be in a 
position to not only adopt the main principles embodied in the so called managed 
competition model but, based on its experiences thus far, it should be able to 
provide useful information and assistance to others, both in the public and private 
sectors, in implementing the program. 
While the TRIG ARE program definition was not formally incorporated into Title 10 of the 
United States Code until 1997, '''^ the necessary basic statutory contracting authority was enacted 
in 1986, and remains largely unchanged today.'"^^ This statutory contracting authority is quite 
broad in both the scope of health care services to be contracted and the range of entities with 
"''' Obsei-vations on Proposed Benefit Expansion Hearing, supra note 39, at 4. 
"*^ GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-245832, DEFENSE HEALTH CARE: IMPLEMENTING COORDINATED CARE - A 
STATUS REPORT 1 (1991) (CHAMPUS costs alone increased "from $1.4 billion in fiscal year 1985 to an estimated 
$3.6 billion in fiscal year 1991"). 
"*Matl-2. 
"•^ Lessons Learnedfi-om DoD's Managed Health Care Initiatives : Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military 
Forces and Personnel, House Comm. on Armed Services, 103"* Cong. (1993) (statement of David P. Baine, Director, 
Federal Health Care Delivery Issues, Human Resources Division, Gen. Accounting Office), 5, at 
http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by GAO Report # T-HRD-93-21). 
'"MOU.S.C. § 1072(7) (2004). 
'"' National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661, §701(a)(l), 100 Stat. 3895 (1986) 
(codified at 10. U.S.C. §1097). 
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which the Secretary may enter into contracts, including HMOs, PPOs, individual providers, 
medical facilities, and insurers to consortiums of such providers, facilities and insurers. "^ 
The development of coordinated care, eventually renamed TRIG ARE, consumed several 
years, and resulted in a significant amount of Congressional and Government Accounting Office 
oversight. Challenges and concerns over how to proceed included the lack of a consensus on the 
appropriate incentives to use in the system, whether carrots or sticks; the need to make key 
operational decisions in the face of little data; the best method to approach budget and resource 
allocation decisions; how to address continuing budget constraints; and the method and scope of 
contracting for health services.'"'" 
1.   Congressional Mandates on the Design of Military Managed Care 
Under continued close Congressional scrutiny, several additional legislative requirements 
were imposed in 1993, as the Department continued to shape its nation-wide plan. First, the 
Department of Defense was directed to develop an HMO health benefit option, modeled on both 
private sector and other similar government health insurance programs, which would then be 
included as one of the options in all future managed health care initiatives.''^ Furthermore, the 
costs of this new HMO option were required to be no greater than the costs that would otherwise 
be incurred under a traditional CHAMPUS fee-for-service structure.'" During the same 
legislative cycle, as part of the aimual Defense Appropriations Act, the Department of Defense 
was required to establish a triple option health benefit plan.'^'' The nation-wide managed health 
care program was required to include: 
''" 10 U.S.C. §1097(a) and (b) (2004). 
''' Obstacles Hearing, supra note 140. 
'" National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 731(a) (1993). 
''■' National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 731(c) (1993). 
'^^ Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, §8025, 107 Stat. 1418, 1443 (1993). 
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(1) a uniform, stabilized benefit structure characterized by a triple option health 
benefit feature; 
(2) a regionally-based health care management system; 
(3) cost minimization incentives including "gatekeeping" and annual enrollment 
procedures, capitation budgeting, and at-risk managed care support contracts; and 
(4) full and open competition for all managed care contracts. "^' 
They were directed to implement this nation-wide system by September 30, 1996. 
2.   Implementation and Growth of TRICARE - The Successes and 
Challenges that Have Arisen 
In accordance with Congressional mandates, TRICARE provides a triple option benefit 
program to beneficiaries:' ''^ 
• TRICARE Prime: a tightly managed HMO-like plan requiring beneficiary 
enrollment and providing coordination of care through a primary care manager. 
Prime care is provided through a combination of direct care resources and 
contractor-provider civilian services as required. Enrollees may also seek care 
from non-network providers through a point-of-service (POS) option. Active-duty 
military are automatically enrolled in TRICARE Prime and other beneficiaries are 
given the option. 
• TRICARE Standard: the traditional indemnity fee-for-service (FFS) benefit, 
formerly CHAMPUS. No enrollment is required. 
• TRICARE Extra: provides beneficiaries with the option of enjoying reduced 
cost sharing through the use of preferred civilian network providers (PPO) on a 
case-by-case basis. No enrollment is required. 
In addition to this triple option benefit program, all beneficiaries may pursue free care from 
1 SS 
military treatment facilities on a space available basis, subject to access priority rules.      The 
'''Id. 
'''Id. 
'" TRICARE Program, 32 C.F.R. § 199.17(a)(6)(ii) (2004). 
'^* TRICARE Program, 32 C.F.R. § 199.17 (d)(1) (2004). Access priority is generally provided in the following 
order: active duty service members, active duty family members enrolled in TRICARE Prime, retirees and their 
family members enrolled in TRICARE Prime, active duty family members not enrolled in TRICARE Prime, and all 
other eligible persons. Id. 
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result is an integrated system that serves two distinct, yet interrelated missions and provides each 
beneficiary with a blending of direct and purchased care. 
a. Contract Award 
The national TRIG ARE implementation plan consisted of awarding a total of seven contracts 
covering twelve regions.'""'^ These contracts were competitively bid by region beginning in 1994 
and proved to be much more difficult and time-consuming than anticipated.'^° These difficuhies, 
coupled with the need for adequate preparation,'^' necessitated an extension of the Congressional 
deadline for nationwide implementation to September 30, 1997.'^^ Not surprisingly, some 
questioned whether the Department of Defense had the necessary technical expertise to evaluate 
offerors' proposals.'^'^ Those concerns were not unfounded as all seven contract awards were 
protested by losing bidders, and three of the seven protests were sustained by the General 
Accounting Office, requiring them to be re-bid. '^"^   The initial contracts were labeled as fixed- 
price, at risk contracts, however the contactors' risks were significantly limited and adjustments 
'''' For a map of the regions, see http://www.tricare.osd.mil. 
'*" DoD 's Managed Care Program Continues to Face Challenges : Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military 
Personnel, House Comm. on National Security, 103"* Cong. (1995) (statement of David P. Baine, Director, Federal 
Health Care Delivery Issues, Health, Education, and Human Services Division, Gen. Accounting Office), 6, at 
http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by Report # T-HEHS-95-] 17) [hereinafter DoD's Program Continues to Face 
Challenges'] (documenting that one regional contract took almost 2 years to award). 
'*' Challenges Facing DoD in Implementing Nationwide Managed Care : Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military 
Forces and Personnel, House Comm. on Armed Services, 104* Cong. (1994) (statement of David P. Baine, Director, 
Federal Health Care Delivery Issues, Health, Education, and Human Services Division, Gen. Accounting Office), 7, 
at http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by Report # T-HEHS-94-145) [hereinafter Challenges Facing DoD in 
Implementing Nationwide Managed Care] (explaining the Congressionally mandated timeline "had created a 
situation in which the procurement process appears to have gotten ahead of some necessary planning tasks" 
including issuing requests for proposals from offerors before the Department's completion of regional plans which 
would identify unique requirements.). 
'*- Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-61, Title VI, 109 Stat. 636, 649 (1995). 
AccordYi.K. Rep. 104-261, at 124 (1995); S. Rep. No. 104-124, at 201 (1995). 
'*^ Challenges Facing DoD in Implementing Nationwide Managed Care, supra note 161, at 7. 
'*'' Lessons Learned from TRICARE Contracts and Implications for the Future: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Military Personnel, House Comm. on Armed Services, 107* Cong. (2001) (statement of Stephen P. Backhus, 
Director, Health Care - Veterans' and Military Health Care Issues, Gen. Accounting Office), 5, at 
http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by Report # GAO-01-742T) [hereinafter les'sora Learned Hearing]. 
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provided for health care cost increases beyond the contractor's control.'^^ TRICARE 
implementation, separate and apart from the contract awards, also proved to be difficult. 
b. Initial Reactions and Challenges 
"We would not expect an undertaking of this size to 
proceed without some problems, and DOD has done well in 
overcoming early difficulties." 
Some of the challenges faced by the Department of Defense are not unique and mirror those 
of the nation, as health care reform took hold in the United States.'^^ A significant portion of the 
'*' Contractors are at risk for up to 1% of health care cost overruns and then shared any additional losses with the 
government until the contractor's prepledged equity is depleted. The government then assumes responsibility for 
any remaining losses. Id at 3. 
"''' Operational Difficulties and System Uncertainties Pose Continuing Challenges for TRICARE: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Military Personnel, House Coinm. on National Security, 105"'Cong. (1998) (statement of Stephen 
P. Backhus, Director, Veterans' Affairs and Military Health Care Issues, Gen. Accounting Office), 3, at 
http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by Report # T-HEHS-98-100) [hereinafter Operational Difficulties and System 
Uncertainties]. 
"^^ TRICARE Progressing, but Some Cost and Performance Issues Remain : Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Militaiy Personnel, House Comm. on National Security, 104* Cong. (1996) (statement of Stephen P. Backhus, 
Associate Director, Health Care Delivery and Quality Issues, Health, Education, and Human Services Division, Gen. 
Accounting Office), 7, at http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by Report # T-HEHS-96-100) [hereinafter TRICARE 
Progressing]. See also TRICARE Administration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel, Sen. 
Comm. on Armed Services, 106"' Cong. (1999) (statement of William J. Meyer, Senior Vice President, Palmetto 
Government Benefits Administrators (Blue Cross and Blue Shield of South Carolina)): 
It is important to note at the outset that every TRICARE contract has struggled in the first year, 
regardless of who the contractor is. There have been major problems and much unhappiness 
among beneficiaries, providers, and contractors on every single contract. But also without 
exception, they all do very well in the second and subsequent years. There are good reasons for 
the problematic start each experience. 
168 jjijQ^j^ Program: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Military Personnel, House Comm. on National Security, 1 OS* 
Cong. (1998) (statement of Brigadier General Dan L. Locker, Lead Agent, Health Service Region 4, Department of 
Defense) ("Problems or perceived problems with military health care are often attributed to TRICARE, when they 
are really a reflection of general trends in U.S. health care or managed care."). Regional TRICARE experiences 
varied to some extent dependent on how dominant civilian managed care was in the region. See, e.g., Jonathan 
Gardner, Growing Pains: Defense Department Finds Adapting to Managed Care Tougher than Expected, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE, Oct. 6, 1997, at 49, at 1997 WL 8802818 ("[T]he Defense Department is finding that its experience 
with its Tricare managed-care program is in some ways a mirtor of the private sector's sometimes troubled 
encounter with managed care."). 
Managed care commentators have observed: 
One needs to take account of the rapidity with which managed care has penetrated American 
medical care and how little time there has been to develop the information and management 
systems required to monitor and fine-tune processes. With changes so large and extensive, there 
have been opportunities for greed, fraud, and incompetence, and we have seen some of each. To 
simply focus on these abertations misses the more central transformation that has occurted. This 
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challenges, however, resulted from TRICARE's unique design of putting "military healthcare 
facilities at the hub of provider networks ... [which] has made treatment more difficult."     A 
majority of the prime contractors were completely new to CHAMPUS and TRICARE "and quite 
naturally tried to equate TRICARE to the commercial products they were accustomed to 
handling."'^° Short implementation periods made the transition all the more difficult.'     Both 
logistical and system design problems resuked in physician organizations terminating their 
contracts with TRICARE regional contractors.'^" Timely claims processing problems were 
virtually universal.'^^ In areas where military treatment facilities were located, doctors 
complained that "inherent problems with the system" and military red tape were interfering with 
transformation provides a beginning framework for systems of care that are better suited than the 
traditional system to the realities of future constraints, changing population dynamics, and new 
technologies. Managed care, in some form, is here to stay, but will need continuing redirection 
and fine-tuning. 
David Mechanic, Judging the Midrange Policy Implications: A Balanced Framework for Change, 24 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL'Y&L. 1107, 1113(1999). 
'*' Gardner, svpra note 168, at 49. See also Observations on Proposed Benefit Expansion Hearing, supra note 39, 
at 17: "As we have reported over the years and reiterated today, the military health system continues to be plagued 
with operational problems which are a source of beneficiaries' and providers' discontent." 
'™ TRICARE Administration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel, Sen. Comm. on Armed Services, 
106* Cong. (1999) (statement of William J. Meyer, Senior Vice President, Palmetto Government Benefits 
Administrators (Blue Cross and Blue Shield of South Carolina)). 
'^' Id. (commenting on Blue Cross and Blue Shield's experiences and noting "the impossible short time between 
contract award and implementation, underlies many if not most of the ftoistrations and complaints that are apparent 
in the first year of a contract."). 
'^' See, e.g.. Defense Health Programs: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Personnel, Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 
106* Cong. (1999) (statement of Joshua W. Krebs, Chief Master Sergeant, Air Force Sergeants Assoc.) ("Hardly a 
month goes by without a news story of another major group of health care providers leaving the TRICARE Prime 
network."); Rex W. Huppke, Lawmakers Enter Tricare Dispute, 6,300 Patients Left in Limbo, GAZETTE (Colorado 
Springs), Sep. 13, 1997, at Al, at 1997 WL 7461197 (reporting the dissolution of a 250 doctor network contract 
with TriWest in Colorado because of physician frustration in not being able to properly serve their patients, leading 
to concerns over liability); Earl Golz, 2 Clinics Rejecting HMO for Veterans, AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN 
(Texas), Dec. 19, 1997, at Dl, ar LEXIS, ALLNWS File (quoting the executive adminisfrator of a regional clinic 
who was withdrawing from Tricare, "It's a very difficult plan to work with.... Their medical management and 
ufilization management procedures are very cumbersome. Their claims payment system is slow and unresponsive." 
The Austin Diagnostic Clinic, which was also withdrawing from Tricare, complained about "some inflexible issues, 
both financial and operafional, that they were unable to work out" including the requirement for specialist referrals 
to be sent back to the nearest military hospital and the fact that Tricare still insisted on paper claims and payments 
vice elecfronic). 
'" See, e.g.. Bill Kaczor, Military Health Insurer Tries to Fix Problems, FLA. TiMES-UNION, Aug. 7, 1997, at B4, at 
1997 WL 11322543; 
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their ability to maintain consistent care for their patients.'^"* The administrative hassles, coupled 
with discounted maximum allowable rates, caused some providers to become disillusioned with 
TRICARE.'^-' 
Observers noted that the system appeared to work better in areas where there were no 
military bases and doctors could maintain greater control over patient treatment.'^^ Beneficiaries 
have complained as well about access to care,''^ the loss of their physicians as they have left the 
TRIG ARE system,'''^ and being required to bounce back and forth between military and civilian 
providers.'^^ With the conversion to TRIG ARE, and mandate to maximize the utilization of 
direct care resources, retirees over the age of 65 quickly discovered there was little or no space 
available at military treatment facilities and hospitals to treat them - TRIGARE has resulted in 
reduced, not improved, access.'^° Pressure mounted to devise some way to accommodate these 
"* Rex W. Huppe, Lawmakers Enter Tricare Dispute - 6,300 Patients Left in Limbo, GAZETTE (Colorado Springs), 
Sep. 13, 1997, at M,at 1997 WL 7461197. 
'" Letter from Stephen P. Backhus, Director, Veterans' Affairs and Military Health Care Issues, General 
Accounting Office, to The Honorable Stephen E. Buyer, Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, 
Committee on National Security, House of Representatives 5-6 (Apr. 10, 1998), a? http://www.gao.gov (retrievable 
by Report # HEHS-98-136R). See also Jonathan Gardner, Some Docs Refusing CHAMPUS Patients, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE, Dec. 11, 1995, at 34, at LEXIS, ALLNWS File (reporting that even before the conversion to 
TRICARE providers were increasingly refusing to accept CHAMPUS patients based on the erosion of payments due 
to the statutory mandate to bring CHAMPUS payments in line with Medicare. "Docs are less willing to care for 
military beneficiaries because they are less likely than Medicare beneficiaries to become permanent patients, and 
they typically are younger patients who will visit doctors less frequently.") 
'^* E.g., Rex W. Huppke, Lawmakers Enter Tricare Dispute, 6,300 Patients Left in Limbo, GAZETTE (Colorado 
Springs), Sep. 13, 1997, at Al, at 1997 WL 7461197. 
'^^ E.g., Debra Gordon, Some Are Losing Their Patience Getting Tricare Appointments, VA-PlLOT, April 17, 1997, 
at B3, at 1997 WL 6401071. See also H.R. REP. No. 105-532, at 314 (1998) (expressing concerns about "the 
complaints of many beneficiaries that the fransition to this managed care program is compromising the quality and 
availability of their health care benefit."). 
"^ E.g., Tom Philpott, Frustrated Retiree Reaches Managed Care's Last Straw, GAZETTE (Colorado Springs), June 
7, 1997, at News6, at 1997 WL 7455992 (chronicling the experiences of a retired Air Force colonel in Alabama 
who, within three months of being enticed to join Tricare Prime, lost is family doctor, endocrinologist and primary 
care manager); Rex W. Huppke, Tricare: More Voices of Discontent — Meeting at Fort Carson Airs Gripes with 
Military's Health-Care System, GAZETTE (Colorado Springs), Nov. 23, 1997, atNewsl, at 1997 WL 7464933 
(reporting on concerns expressed by beneficiaries over the "beleaguered Tricare system"). 
"^ See, e.g.. Defense Health Programs: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Personnel, Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 
106* Cong. (1999) (statement of Joshua W. Krebs, Chief Master Sergeant, Air Force Sergeants Assoc). 
'^^ E.g., Nolan Walters, Tricare Medical System is Under the Gun for Treatment of Retirees, MACON TELEGRAPH, 
March 30, 1997, at A14, at 1997 WL 9543846 (quoting the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Issues on the 
need to accommodate 65 and older retirees or risk collapse of the whole Tricare system, "Beyond the issues of 
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Medicare eligible retirees and their beneficiaries within the Department of Defense medical care 
system.'^' 
c. Providing a Uniform Benefit Structure 
Following the diverse demonstration projects, and resultant differences in benefits between 
regions, TRIG ARE sought to provide a uniform benefit in the form of a triple option plan. With 
such a fluid beneficiary population resulting from frequent military moves, consistency of 
benefits across regions was viewed as particularly important. In addition to the challenges of 
maintaining a uniform benefit across the nation, the integrated nature of the military's direct and 
purchased care health system structure itself created another type of inequity. Visits to the direct 
care system were essentially free while copayments were required from beneficiaries who 
utilized civilian care, regardless of how they came to utilize that civilian care. Requiring 
beneficiaries to incrementally share in the cost of more expensive care is a basic tenet of 
managed care, which is intended to drive beneficiary behavior.'^^ Perceived inequities occur, 
however, when these charges are incurred in a somewhat random fashion regardless of 
beneficiary behavior. This created a unique inequity for TRICARE Prime beneficiaries, who 
were assigned to primary care providers and whose care is tightly managed. Available resources, 
which varied by military facility, often times drove whether patients saw military or civilian 
providers. Compounded with fairly frequent moves, and the need to "releam their health care 
program ... [tjhese variations in health care offering have caused confusion and inequities 
fairness, equity and responsibility - and those a [sic] truly there -1 think that's a stone if you pull it out, the arch 
collapses."); Tom Philpott, Military Update: Most Madigan Beneficiaries Hail Tricare, but Older Retirees Unhappy, 
NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, WA), April 15, 1996, at B6, at 1996 WL 2984845 ("Quite honestly, the over-65 group 
sees this as a lockout and is very angry"); Eric Minton, Tricare: On the Front Lines, 11 INDEPENDENT LIVING 
PROVIDER 14 (1996), at LEXIS, ALLNWS File (retirees "screaming betrayal"). 
'*' See, e.g.. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 752,111 Stat. 1629, 
1823-24(1997). 
'*" Mark A. Hall, supra note 4, at 1. 
43 
among beneficiaries."'^^ As a result of these concerns, copayments were eliminated for active 
duty family members enrolled in TRIG ARE Prime.'^"^ 
d. Claims Processing 
Contractors and providers complained that TRICARE's complexity and mandated 
procedures impeded efficiencies in claims processing. '^"' Claims processing practices and hence 
costs deviated significantly from industry norms.'^^ Multiple reimbursement levels made claims 
processing all the more complicated.'^'' Moreover, TRICARE beneficiaries account for a very 
small percentage of most civilian providers' business.'^^ Consequently, civilian providers were 
more prone to sacrifice TRICARE business due to their dissatisfaction over claims processing 
'*' Observations on Proposed Benefit Expansion Hearing, supra note 39, at 4-5. 
'**' National Defense Authorization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 752, 114 Stat. 1654A-194 (amending 10 
U.S.C. § 1097ato include anew subsection (e)). 
'^^ Opportunities to Reduce TRICARE Claims Processing and Other Costs: Hearing Before the Task Force on 
Defense and International Relations, House Comm. on Budget, 106* Cong. (2000) (statement of Stephen P. 
Backhus, Director, Veterans' Affairs and Military Health Care Issues, Gen. Accounting Office), 3, at 
http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by Report # T-HEHS-00-138) [hereinafter Opportunities to Reduce Costs]. 
'** For example, in 2000: 
- TRICARE claims processing costs averaged $7.50 per claim - double the industry average and more 
than four times the $1.78 Medicare claims processing cost. 
- Contractors [indicated] that of the many programs they administer, including Medicare and private 
plans, TRICARE is the most complicated. 
- Over half of TRICARE claims were manually reviewed, a rate significantly higher than the industry 
average of 25%. 
Claim inquiry rates were four times higher under TRICARE than Medicare. 
- Less than 20% of claims were submitted electronically compared to 85% under Medicare. 
Id at 3-5. 
187 fjijQj^]^ j^(j,ijifjjgfyuiiQyi: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel, Sen. Comm. on Armed Services, 
106* Cong. (1999) (statement of William J. Meyer, Senior Vice President, Palmetto Government Benefits 
Administrators (Blue Cross and Blue Shield of South Carolina)): 
Under CHAMPUS, reimbursement of claims was easily understood [capped by CHAMPUS 
maximum allowable charges and DRGs]. Under TRICARE, reimbursement is immeasurably 
more complicated and very difficult to understand. Contractors are charged with negotiating the 
best prices possible with providers. The result is that non-network providers are paid the way they 
always were, but network providers can be paid in as many ways as the imagination and advanced 
computer systems allow.... These fee plans are complicated by the fact that there are different 
reimbursement rates for enrolled versus non-enrolled beneficiaries, in or out of network providers, 
authorized or unauthorized care, referred or non-referred specialist care, and treatment in or out of 
the Region where the patient is enrolled. Neither the providers nor the beneficiaries can figure out 
what the reimbursement should be for a particular service, which results in errors and 
misunderstandings. 
'^* Opportunities to Reduce Costs, supra note 185, at 4 (indicating TRICARE often accounts for less than 5 percent 
of providers' income). 
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and had little incentive to adopt procedures for electronic claims submissions.      The 
Department of Defense, Congress and contractors invested a substantial amount of effort to solve 
this problem. Legislation was also enacted to facilitate the timely processing of claims and 
authorized incentives for electronic processing.'^"^ Significant improvements have been made on 
a number of fronts.'^' Despite the fact that the number of claims filed tripled from 2000 to 
2002,'^^ 97% or more of claims have consistently been processed within the 30 day TRICARE 
goal.'^^ Additionally, as of the end of fiscal year 2002, over 70% of claims are now submitted 
electronically.'^'* The percentage of TRICARE participating providers filing claims on behalf of 
military beneficiaries now exceed civilian benchmarks for HMO and PPO plans.      Finally, 
while significant improvements have been made, beneficiary satisfaction with claims processing 
accuracy and timeliness still slightly lags the civilian benchmark.'^^ 
e. Ensuring Access to Care 
Beneficiary complaints over access to care and the difficulty in making appointments have 
continued since the inception of TRICARE.'^^ The problems experienced can be traced to the 
'*' Id. at 6. Similar difficulties were experienced under Medicare prior to the enactment of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1989, which required all providers, vice beneficiaries, to submit claims forms directly. See S. 
REP. No. 102-113, at 189 (1991) (suggesting DoD could benefit from a similar practice). 
"° See 10 U.S.C. § 1095(c) (2004). See also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 
106-398, § 727, 114 Stat. 1654A-188 (mandating additional claims processing improvements); National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 725, 114 Stat. 1654A-187 (seeking 
recommendations to discourage/prevent TRICARE providers from seeking direct reimbursement from 
beneficiaries). 
''' One provider indicated, "TRICARE went from being our slowest and worst payer to our fastest and best payer." 
TRICARE Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel, House Comm. on National Security, 
105* Cong. (1998) (statement of Brigadier General Dan L. Locker, Lead Agent, Health Service Region 4, 
Department of Defense). 
'^- The number of claims filed increased from 33.9 million in 200 to roughly 96 million in 2002. 2003 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, supra note 10, at 23. 
'''Id 
'"* Id at 24. 
'"'Id at!]. 
'"^ Id at 22. 
''^^ Defense Health Programs: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Total Force, House. Comm. on Armed Services, 108' 
Cong. (2004) (statement of Kimberly Ann Stanish, National Military Veterans Alliance, Health Care Committee Co- 
Chair, and Benjamin Butler, National Association for Unifonned Services, Director of Legislation) (stating 
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unique, integrated nature of the military health care system. Appointment making processes 
differ by location. How direct care appointments were allocated between the contract and 
military treatment facilities for scheduling of patients, as well as how beneficiary priorities were 
JQO 
accounted for in scheduling appointments differed by location as well.      As TRICARE 
implementation has progressed, and military treatment facilities work with the managed care 
support contractors, access to care has improved.'^^ The Department of Defense continues to 
pursue new initiatives to improve patient access and thus satisfaction. 
f. Developing and Maintaining Adequate Civilian Provider Networks 
In order to augment and supplement care provided at military treatment facilities, 
TRICARE's managed care support contractors are responsible for establishing and maintaining 
civilian provider networks to support the TRICARE Prime and Extra Options.^*'' Within their 
respective regions, these contractors must establish networks in all military treatment facility 
catchment areas, all base realignment and closure sites and all noncatchment areas where the 
beneficiary population is large enough to justify a network.^°^ Contractors found network 
development to be a challenge.^°^ Provider dissatisfaction resulted in significant provider 
"[a]ccess to care is still the ... number one concern."), at 
http://armedservices.house.gOv/openingstatementsandpressreleases/l 08thcongress/04-03-l 8butler.html. But see 
Message from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Military Health System - Measures for 
Success, at http://www.ha.osd.mil/asd/mhs_measures.cfrn (last updated July 23, 2003) (citing performance mefrics 
for satisfaction with access to telephone care in the 80% range, slightly below target). 
"^ Observations on Proposed Benefit Expansion Hearing, supra note 39, at 15-16. 
''' Compare DEP'T OF DEF., EVALUATION OF THE TRICARE PROGRAM FOR FY1999: FY2001 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, 3-14 - 3-20 (2002) (documenting beneficiary perceptions of availability of care in FY94 and FY99) with 
2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 10, at 16-20 (documenting trends from FYOO to FY02). 
"°° Military Health System Hearing 2003, supra note 36, at 5 (testifying on two new programs - TRICARE Online 
for online appointment scheduling, and "Open Access", which provides same-day routine and acute appointments to 
Prime enrollees). 
^'" Letter from Stephen P. Backhus, Director, Veterans' Affairs and Military Health Care Issues, General 
Accounting Office, to The Honorable Stephen Buyer, Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee 
on Armed Services, House of Representatives 3 (Mar. 13, 2000), at http://www.gao.gov (refrievable by Report # 
HEHS-00-64R). 
^°^ Confractors were required to build massive networks, usually spanning multiple states within a matter of a few 
months. 
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turnover during the initial years of TRICARE implementation.^^'* As the programs have 
stabilized, administrative requirements have lessened, and claims processing have improved, 
concerns over provider attrition should have lessened. Nonetheless, beneficiaries and providers 
are still expressing dissatisfaction,^"^ resulting in Congressional action directing the Department 
of Defense to improve its oversight and methodology to ensure civilian network adequacy. 
Not surprisingly, there have also been some deficiencies in more rural, underserved areas, 
similarly to those experienced by Medicare.^"'' Furthermore, an integrated direct and purchased 
care systerh as unique as the military's raises additional challenges regarding network adequacy. 
Considering the primary mission of the military health care system, and the inevitable occurrence 
of military medical deployments, what constitutes network adequacy can fluctuate greatly, 
depending on the capacity of the direct care system and resultant quantity of network referrals. 
g. The Importance and Challenges of Partnership in an Integrated System 
"[T]he core factor to success in the TRICARE program is the 
development of a partnership between the prime contractor, the 
In some cases the Contractor is working in an area that is unfamiliar and where that company had 
no previous relationships with providers. Commercial managed care companies avoid some of the 
mari<ets TRICARE is entering; because of their small size there is not much competition among 
healthcare providers. They simply have no interest in joining a managed care network when there 
is no financial incentive to do so. When a community has only one hospital, it is difficult to get 
that hospital to sign on to a network. 
TRICARE Administration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel, Sen. Comm. on Armed Services, 
106* Cong. (1999) (statement of William J. Meyer, Senior Vice President, Palmetto Government Benefits 
Administrators (Blue Cross and Blue Shield of South Carolina)). 
204 "[M]aintenance of networks will remain a challenge as reimbursements are among the lowest that civilian 
providers receive and as managed care continues to be resisted." TRICARE Program: Hearing Before Subcomm. on 
Military Personnel, House Comm. on National Security, 105* Cong. (1998) (statement of Colonel Steve E. 
Phurrough, Lead Agent, TRICARE Central Region, U.S. Army). 
-°' GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-928, OVERSIGHT OF THE TRICARE CIVILIAN PROVIDER NETWORK SHOULD 
BE IMPROVED 17 (2003), at http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by Report # GAO-03-928). 
-'"' H.R. REP. NO. 108-106, at 338 (2003). 
-"^ Backhus, supra note 201, at 2; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-36, PHYSICIAN SHORTAGE AREAS: 
MEDICARE INCENTIVE PAYMENTS NOT AN EFFECTIVE APPROACH TO IMPROVE ACCESS (1999), at 
http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by Report # HEHS-99-36). These isolated difficulties, however, have not justified 
an overall increase in physician reimbursement rates. ACROSS-THE-BOARD PHYSICIAN RATE INCREASE, supra note 
132. 
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military treatment facilities, the Lead Agent, the Department of 
Defense, and the Services. "' 
The integrated nature of the TRICARE managed health care system presented some unique 
leadership and management challenges,     not to mention confusion. '   With competing military 
missions and numerous stakeholders, multiple organizational structures, and competing needs for 
power and control over resources and persormel, TRICARE governance is particularly tricky. 
Moreover, one of the concerns expressed throughout the military's transition to managed care 
was whether the Department of Defense possessed the necessary expertise to contract for and run 
such a sophisticated program. As a result, Congress directed the Department of Defense to 
establish a health care management and administration program for military treatment facility 
commanders who were designated as regional lead agents and other appropriate individuals.^"^ 
"   Medical Issues: Hearing Before Siibcomm. on Personnel, House Comm. on Armed Services, 106' Cong. (2000) 
(statement of David J. Mclntyre, Jr., President and CEO TriWest Healthcare Alliance). 
^"^ Describing the relationship between lead agent and prime contractor, one lead agent testified: 
We have disagreements, dissatisfaction with performance on both sides, and contractual issues that 
require negotiation of additional payments to the contractor or from the contractor to the 
government. These issues have always been addressed amicably and without rancor or 
disharmony. At times, this Region has provided resources to TriWest to accomplish tasks with 
which it was having difficulty. At other times, TriWest has provided additional resources without 
compensation to accomplish time sensitive tasks. We view each other as crucial members of a 
joint healthcare delivery team that is working to ensure that beneficiaries receive the high quality 
healthcare that they deserve. 
TRICARE Program: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Military Personnel, House Comm. on National Security, 105* 
Cong. (1998) (statement of Colonel Steve E. Phurrough, Lead Agent, TRICARE Central Region, U.S. Arniy). 
-'"S. REP. No. 104-112, at 263 (1995): 
The role of the TRICARE lead agent vis-a-vis the TRICARE contractor is unclear to the 
committee, and, we suspect, the lead agents themselves. Clearly, in the MHSS, the military lead 
agent should be considered the final authority. However, there are a large number of functions 
which can be accomplished more efficiently and more effectively by the TRICARE contractor. 
The committee believes that the issue of how responsibility is shared cannot be ambiguous and 
must be guided by military medical readiness and stewardship of the available resources. The 
Assistant Secretary of Defense and the Surgeons General must clearly define the sharing of 
responsibilities and ensure that there is no doubt or confusion of the part of the lead agents or the 
TRICARE contractors. 
^" For a detailed discussion of the current organization structure and a comparison of organization in the private 
sector versus TRICARE, see HOSEK & CECCHINE, supra note 39, at 5-13 and 25-42 (observing that the TRICARE 
organization "displays few of the characteristics of civilian organizations" with respect to the health-plan function). 
^'^ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 715 , 110 Stat. 186, 375 
(1995). For more information on the program itself, see DEP'T OF DEF., VIRTUAL MILITARY HEALTH INSTITUTE: 
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The Department of Defense established the TRIG ARE Management Activity (TMA) within 
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, with the goal of 
strengthening "program oversight and performance by developing and using specific 
performance measures for the program's costs, quality, and health care access."      Since its 
inception, the TRICARE governance structure has been modified in an ongoing effort to 
strengthen the partnership between the direct care infrastructure and the managed care support 
services contractors as well clarify the responsibilities, authority and accountability of the 
various system stakeholders, including the new TRICARE Regional Directors, Lead Agents, 
contractors, and individual military treatment facility commanders. 
PROMOTING EXCELLENCE IN EXECUTIVE SKILLS FOR THE MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM, 2002 CONGRESSIONAL 
REPORT (2002). 
^'^ Operational Difficulties and System Uncertainties, supra note 166, at 11. 
"''' For additional information, see Defense Health Program House Hearing 2004, supra note 1 (written statement of 
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, MBA, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs) (discussing the latest 
TRICARE governance structure); Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense for Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Health Affairs) (Jan. 20, 2004), at http://www.ha.osd.mil/policies/2004/tricare_govemance_guidance.pdf 
(discussing the new plan and directing immediate implementation). 
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h. Current TRICARE Benefit Structure 
A brief summary of the three benefit programs as they currently exist is provided below: 
TABLE 1 


































SO SO $0 SO 
Civilian 
Outpatient 
SO $12 15% of 
negotiated fee 






Civilian Inpatient $0 $11/day ($25 
min.) 
> $25 or 
S13.32/day 
< S250/day or 25% of 
negotiated charges + 
20% of negotiated 
professional fees 
> $25 or 
$13.32/day 
< $441/day 







Catastrophic cap^ $1000/yr $3000/yr $1000/yr $3000/yr $1000/yr $3000/yr 
Basic Description HMO - most care provided 
in MTFs, augmented by the 
preferred provider network 
PPO - providers limited to network Traditional CHAMPUS (FFS) 
Additional Points ** least out-of-pocket costs. 
- Must reside in an area 
where Prime is offered. 
- Requires enrollment. 
- Care coordinated through 
PCM/referrals required. 
- Offers POS option' 
- Copayment 5% less than Standard. 
- No balanced billing and no forms to 
file. 
- Non-participating providers 
may balance bill up to 15% 
above the allowable charge. 
- May also use TRICARE 
Extra. 
- Nonavailability statements 
may be required before 
civilian inpatient care may be 
obtained. 
' The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 eliminated copayments (except mail order 
phamiaceutical benefits) for active duty dependents enrolled in Prime.   Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 752, 114 Stat. 1654 (2000) 
(codified at 10 U.S.C. §1097a(e)). 
" Retirees and their family members who reach age 65 are no longer eligible for TRICARE Prime, Extra or Standard but instead 
are eligible for TRICARE for Life and continued treatment in military treatment facilities and hospitals on a space available 
basis. 
' Junior enlisted families, paygrades E-4 and below, pay a discounted annual deductible of S50/individual or $100/family. 
" Includes annual deductibles, co-pays, inpatient and outpatient care and prescription cost shares. 
' TRICARE Prime POS option allows enrollees to obtain care from any authorized TRICARE provider without a referral from 
their PCM. Additional deductibles and cost-shares apply. 
^'^ Data obtained from the Department of Defense TRICARE website http://www.tricare.osd.mil/. Data is current 
for 2004. This chart is intended to provide a quick overview of the three primary options under TRICARE and is by 
no means a complete and detailed undertaking of all benefit particulars. 
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D. 21'* Century Challenges 
"The military health care system has changed continually over the 
years as a result of legislative initiatives designed to enhance 
coverage for military beneficiaries. " 
The Department of Defense's military health care system is anything but static. Challenges 
have continued into the 21'' Century?'^ TRIG ARE benefits and eligible beneficiaries continue to 
expand?'^ The most significant changes involve retired, Medicare-eligible beneficiaries. Prior 
to the enactment of TRIG ARE for Life,^'^ military retirees and their beneficiaries ceased to be 
eligible for CHAMPUS, and later TRICARE, benefits upon reaching the age of 65, at which 
point they became eligible for Medicare.^^° Beginning in Fiscal Year 2002, TRICARE now 
serves as a second payer to Medicare.^^' The sole prerequisite is that beneficiaries must be 
enrolled in Medicare Part B.^^^ If so enrolled, TRICARE for Life pays all out-of-pocket costs for 
Medicare covered services and will also pay for TRICARE covered services not covered by 
Medicare.^^^ There is no premium, deductible or copayments required other than the monthly 
cost of Medicare Part B itself This new benefit covers roughly 1.5 million beneficiaries     and 
added approximately $3.0 billion in expenses to the military health care budget in 2003. 
^"^ Operational Difficulties and System Uncertainties, supra note 166, at 11-12. 
^'' See, e.g.. Defense Health Program House Hearing 2004, supra note 1 (testimony of Vice Admiral Michael L. 
Cowan, Medical Corps, United States Navy Surgeon General): 
I think that is has been a struggle for us all, particularly since '01, because of the rapid change in 
the benefit.... [I]f we could have a time to allow these oscillations of our patient behavior and our 
funding predictions to get in a more stable environment, then I think that we would all be much 
happier with our performance, our projections, our expectations and our ability to care for patients. 
^'* DEP'T OF DEF., 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 10, at 2. 
-'' National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 712, 114 Stat. 1654A-176 
(2000) (amending 10 U.S.C. § 1086(d)). 
^^^ 10 U.S.C. § 1086(d)(1) (2004). 
^-' 10 U.S.C. § 1086(d)(2) (2004). 
^^- 10 U.S.C. § 1086(d)(2)(A) (2004). 
^" 10 U.S.C. § 1086(d)(3) (2004). 
224 £)Ep'x OF DEF., 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 10, at 14. 
^"^ CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at ix. 
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Additionally, TRIG ARE Senior Pharmacy (TSRx), effective in 2001,^"^ provides a 
comprehensive pharmacy benefit to seniors.^^^ TRICARE for Life and TRICARE Senior 
Pharmacy benefits together account for approximately one-third of the Department of Defense's 
228 purchased health care costs. 
Most recently, Congress enacted a number of provisions to improve access and enhance 
health care benefits for military reservists and their families.      Most notably. Congress 
extended temporary eligibility for TRICARE enrollment on a cost-share basis to non-mobilized 
reservists who otherwise lacked health insurance.^'^" The Department of Defense has not yet 
implemented this new benefit and has failed to budget for it in future years.^'^' There have also 
been numerous other benefit enhancements the Department of Defense has had to incorporate 
into its managed care system. 
Simultaneously, there is continued pressure to downsize the direct care system through 
reductions in military end strength^^^ and concerns over the impact of the next round of base 
^-^ National Defense Authorization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, §711,114 Stat. 1654A-175 - 176 (2000). 
^"^ Prescriptions are filled for free at military treatment facilities and minimal co-payments ($3 for generics and $9 
for brand name drugs) are required for drugs procured through purchased-care (through either the TRICARE mail 
order pharmacy or retail networks). For additional information on this benefit, see 
http://www.tricare.osd.mil/pharmacy/seniorpharmacy.cfm. 
228 Q£p'j Qp Qgp^ 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS, svpra note 10, at 14. 
--' National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, Title VII, Subpart A, 117 Stat. 
1392(2003). 
-^°10U.S.C.§ 1076b (2004). 
"■'' See Defense Health Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Personnel, Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 
108* Cong. 16 (2004) (statement of William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, MBA, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Health Affairs), at http://anned-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2004/March/Winkenwerder.pdf [hereinafter Defense 
Health Programs Senate Hearing 2004] (expressing concern over the costs and effect of this new entitlement). 
^'- See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, Title VII, 114 Stat. 1654A (2000) 
(eliminating copayments for active duty members enrolled in Prime, extending TRICARE Prime Remote to active 
duty family members stationed in remote areas, providing permanent chiropractic health care benefits to active duty 
members). 
-"' Mark D. Faram, Searching for Cuts in Shore Jobs, NAVY TIMES, Feb. 23,2004, at 8 (discussing Department of 
the Navy plans to "convert 1,775 enlisted and officer medical billets into civilian or contracted positions during 
fiscal 2005"). 
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realignment and closures. Congressional action is prevalent in this area?'^'* "[T]he department's 
annual spending on medical care [adjusted for the overall rate of inflation] almost doubled from 
1988 to 2003, rising from $14.6 billion to $27.2 billion."^^' During this same period, the 
significant downsizing of the active duty military forces resulted in a 38 percent reduction in the 
size of the force.^^^ With enhanced benefits and expanding beneficiary populations, however, 
the reduction in active duty forces has not resulted in a decline in beneficiaries or health care 
costs. 
IV.     Analyzing the Continuing Challenges of System Mission, Design, and Market 
Limitations - This Isn't Your Standard Employer-Sponsored Plan 
The military health care system's transition to one of managed care is nothing short of a 
tremendous undertaking with phenomenal complexity. There is no denying its unique nature. 
Despite its accomplishments to date, challenges remain. Arguably, an examination of some of 
the similarities and differences between this system and other federal health care purchasing 
models helps to explain why some federal health care purchasing programs are viewed as more 
successful than others. Success is difficult to define, however, unless put into context by an 
understanding of the health care system's ultimate goals. True success may be elusive if not 
adequately and realistically defined. Depending on the context, success may mean cost 
effectiveness, maximization of market competition, beneficiary satisfaction or suitability as a 
'^''^See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 726, 117Stat. 1392 
(2003) (concerned that future base closures may have an adverse impact on beneficiaries' access to health care. 
Congress has required the establishment of a working group to plan for continuing health care for beneficiaries 
affected by BRAC 2005 closures); Departinent of Defense Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-259, § 8060, 
114 Stat. 656 (2000) (prohibiting further reductions in civilian medical personnel assigned to military treatment 
facilities absent certification to Congress); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 
101-510, § 711, 104 Stat 1485, 1582 (1990) (prohibiting further reductions in both military and civilian medical 
personnel absent certification to Congress that such personnel were in excess of current and projected needs and 
such a reduction would not increase CHAMPUS costs). 
^" CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at ix. 
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model for universal application. One size does not necessarily fit all as a comparison between 
the Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan (FEHBP), as a representative model of employer- 
sponsored health plans, and TRIG ARE demonstrates. Evaluating the performance of TRICARE 
through the lens of the standard employer benefit plans neglects to account for the true 
differences in program goals. 
Not surprisingly, because the FEHBP is often cited as an ideal model for health care reform, 
there have been repeated suggestions, bills introduced,^^^ studies mandated     and even a 
demonstration project^^^ to examine the feasibility and efficacy of providing benefits under the 
FEHBP to all or a portion of military beneficiaries as an alternative to utilizing the military 
health care system. This approach would seem quite logical based on the perceived success of 
FEHBP. Such an approach, however, would require a severing of the dual missions either in 
whole or for certain beneficiary classes. As problematic as the military's resistance to mission 
severance is, so too is the unwillingness of beneficiaries to accept increased cost-sharing under 
the FEHBP.^""^ 
If anything, more similarities may be dravm between TRICARE and Medicare, as the two 
struggle to contain rising health care costs with only a limited ability to drive beneficiary and 
provider behavior. Medicare's egalitarian characteristics, coupled with a heavily regulated 
defined benefit and cost controls, have presented the program with ongoing challenges as it seeks 
^" See, e.g., OFFERING FEHBP TO DoD, supra note 38 (reviewing 9 bills introduced in the 105* Congress to extend 
FEHBP to military beneficiaries). 
-'* See, e.g.. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 717, 113 Stat. 512, 692 
(1999) (requiring a comparative report on health care coverage under TRICARE and FEHBP); National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 723, 106 Stat. 2315, 2440 (1992) (requiring a study 
of FEHBP to determine whether it would be a cost effective alternative). 
^'^ Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-261, § 721 , 112 
Stat. 1920,2061-65 (1998) (enacted at 10 U.S.C. § 1108 (mandating a three-year FEHBP demonstration project for 
Medicare-eligible military retirees). 
^'^° Enrollment in the demonstration project peaked at only 5.5 percent, with many beneficiaries indicating they 
believed they "had better benefits and lower costs than the coverage they could obtain from FEHBP." GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MILITARY RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS: ENROLLMENT LOW IN FEDERAL EMPLOYEE HEALTH 
PLANS UNDER DOD DEMONSTRATION (2003), at http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by Report # GAO-03-547). 
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to capitalize on the benefits of managed care reform.^'*' The Department of Defense's has sought 
to do the same and experienced some similar challenges. As two federally financed and heavily 
regulated health care programs, Congress has sought at times to utilize lessons learned from one 
program for the benefit of the other - Medicare experiences have driven the military health care 
system at times,^"*^ and vice versa?"*^ Unfortunately, neither has been completely successful at 
harnessing the health care industry, as both programs stand in stark contrast to the standard, post- 
ERISA deregulated employer sponsored health benefit plan. 
A. The Added Complexities of Serving a Special Class of Beneficiaries and the Sense of 
Entitlement 
While officially the Defense Health Program is still a discretionary budget program, fiinded 
by annual appropriations, it resembles and is treated as an entitlement program.^'*'* Over the last 
50 years, the military health system has evolved from a gratuitous benefit based on a moral 
imperative to essentially a highly regulated virtual entitlement program through numerous 
Congressional enactments and oversight. 
While some may consider the military health care system just another employer-sponsored 
^'*' See. e.g., Butler & Moffit, supra note 59. 
'^^ For example, the CHAMPUS maximum allowable charge for provider reimbursement is directly tied to Medicare 
reimbursement rates. Additionally, when the Department of Defense continued to experience claims processing 
problems, it was believed they could benefit irom the same procedures Medicare had used to solve their problem. 
'''^' As evidenced by the Senate Finance Committee's April 2003 hearing on the purchasing of health care in a 
competitive environment. See infra notes 305 and 306 and accompanying text. 
^'^'^ Defense Health Program House Hearing 2004, supra note 1 (testimony of Dr. William Winkenwerder, Jr., 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs). See also TRICARE Program: Hearing Before Subcomm. on 
Military Personnel, House Comm. on Armed Sei-vices, 107* Cong. (2001) (statement of David J. Mclntyre, Jr., 
President and CEO, TriWest Health Alliance) ("Adding to this complexity is the fact that the DHP is essentially an 
entitlement program within the discretionary portion of the DoD budget."). With such a unique status, mixed 
signals are sent and interesting questions have arisen. For example, in investigating whether the Antideficiency Act 
applies to the obligations and expenditures of the defense health program, the General Accounting Office concluded 
"that DHP actions are 'authorized by law' regardless of the amount of available budgetary resources and do not 
violate the Antideficiency Act." Letter from Anthony H. Gamboa, General Counsel, General Accounting Office, B- 
287619, to The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman, Subcomm. on Defense, House Comm. on Appropriations 10 (July 
5, 2001), at http://www.gao.gov (retrievable by GAO Decision # B-287619). 
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health care plan, the system is much more.^'*"' These benefits are viewed as critical to recruiting 
and retaining the all volunteer military force of today. If anything, the military health care 
system resembles more of an egalitarian-type system.^"*^ The distinctions in views, and resultant 
approach in utilizing the market, can be directly linked to many of the challenges experienced by 
the Department of Defense during its conversion to a system of managed care. In many ways, 
the Department of Defense has even less flexibility than the Medicare program does due to the 
747 
very generous and uniform nature of military health care benefits. 
For example, the moral imperative notion permeates military health care and is repeatedly 
manifested in Congressional action^"*^ and beneficiary attitudes.^"*^ The result has been one of 
ever increasing benefits while costs to beneficiaries have remained lower than any other federal 
or private employer insurance program. Viewed as an important quality of life benefit for 
military families and the promise of a lifetime of health care for retirees, the military health care 
system's approach to cost containment in no way reflects that of the private sector, where 
beneficiaries are required to bear more and more of the cost of health care in an effort to make 
the consumer cost-conscious and control utilization. "Although DoD has adopted some of the 
same practices as private employers ... the trend in DoD has generally been toward greater 
"''^ See, e.g., Tricare and Alternatives for Retiree Health Care: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Military Personnel, 
Home Comm. on National Security, 104* Cong. (1996) (statement of Rep. Robert J. Doman, Chairman, 
Subcommittee on Military Personnel) (citing objective of "ensuring that the millions of Americans who steadfastly 
served this country continue to receive the medical care they so faithfully earned.") (emphasis added). 
^""^ For a more detailed discussion of the inherent tensions between market competition and modestly egalitarian 
social contracts, and the application of these policies to Medicare reform see ROSENBLATT, supra note 23, at 131 -35, 
374-77, and 407-10. 
^■"^ Considering the uniform nature of benefits provided under TRICARE in contrast with those offered under 
Medicare's various M+C managed care plans. 
^*^ See. e.g.. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 752, 111 Stat. 1629, 
1823 (1997) (expressing the sense of Congress that the US has incurred a moral obligation to provide health care for 
military retirees). Three years later, Congress enacted Tricare for Life. 
■"' See RICHARD A. BEST, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB93103, ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS: MILITARY MEDICAL 
CARE SERVICES, 13 (March 20, 2003), temporarily a? http://hutchison.senate.gov/Health5.pdf ("Specifically, these 
benefits are not viewed by some beneficiaries as an insurance program paid for in a market context, but rather as a 
benefit that is earned by the unique nature of demands inherent in performing military service."). 
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coverage and lower copayments and deductibles."^'° Additionally, unlike the private sector, the 
Department of Defense can not simply raise premiums to adjust when the program costs exceed 
best budget estimates?"'' 
The ensuing challenges have been manifested in several significant ways. First, over- 
utilization continues to plague the military health care system, hampering its ability to more fully 
realize the benefits of managed care reform.^'^ In addition to over-utilization by existing 
beneficiaries, the ever-increasing richness of benefits has continued to induce ghost 
beneficiaries, who while entitled were not utilizing military health care benefits, to drop their 
other forms of insurance and utilize TRICARE. ' 
Managed care in large part in based on the use of incentives, in the form of both carrots and 
sticks, to drive behavior. Throughout the experimentation with and ultimate implementation of 
managed care, the military health care system has been constrained in the range of incentives 
with which they could seek to drive beneficiary behavior. From a beneficiary standpoint, the 
original CHAMPUS benefits were quite generous with relatively small cost-sharing 
requirements, and the alternative - treatment in military treatment facilities - is free. 
^^° CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 10. 
"^' Defense Health Program House Hearing 2004, supra note 1 (testimony of Dr. William Winkenwerder, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs). 
-" See SUSAN D. HOSEK ET. AL, RAND CORP, MR-401 -1-OSD, THE DEMAND FOR MILITARY HEALTH CARE 4-5 
(1995), at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR407.1. See also RINGEL, supra note 63 (highlighting four key 
differences between demand for health care in general and in the military). A perfect example is the elimination of 
copays for active duty family members enrolled in Prime despite the existence of an earlier study indicating such a 
policy would result in increased utilization. Study findings predicted a 30 percent increase in outpatient use as a 
result of the elimination of the $6 or $12 PRIME copays. RICHARD D. MILLER, CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS, 
VOLUME TRADE-OFF FACTORS FOR THE MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM (1999), at 
http://www.cna.org/research/pdfs/health/crm99_78.pdf 
^'^ See, e.g.. Defense Health Program House Hearing 2004, supra note 1 (testimony of Vice Admiral Michael L. 
Cowan, Medical Corps, United States Navy Surgeon General) ("As the word of TRICARE's quality and 
effectiveness spreads, and as the cost of other insurance programs rise, more and more retirees under 65 are 
dropping other health insurance plans and relying on TRICARE [T]his year we estimate 7 percent increase in 
the returning population.") 
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As managed care alternatives were considered and designed, the notion that there was 
already an entitlement under the original system limited the Department of Defense's ability to 
change existing benefits, namely the provision of free direct care, or to use negative incentives in 
order to draw beneficiaries away from the standard CHAMPUS benefits to a less costly form of 
managed care. For example. Congress instituted a prohibition on the collection of user fees for 
outpatient care provided at military treatment facilities to non-active duty beneficiaries. "^ 
Additionally, when the Department of Defense sought to increase standard CHAMPUS cost- 
sharing and lock beneficiaries out of the direct care system who did not elect to voluntarily enroll 
in a managed care option. Congress took action to prohibit the use of these sticks. ^   With free 
direct care and the cost of original CHAMPUS fee-for-service care relatively minimal, there was 
limited room within which the Department of Defense could work to make a managed care plan 
appear all the more attractive. As a result, military beneficiaries have a decreased incentive to 
switch between various plans, as the magnitude of the carrots and sticks themselves was 
relatively minor, and there was always the option of free space available care at military 
treatment facilities. 
Interestingly, annual deductibles under CHAMPUS, and now TRICARE, have only been 
increased once since the original creation of the purchased care element in the military health 
care system.^^^ Furthermore, there are no enrollment fees for military beneficiaries, with the 
exception of retirees under the age of sixty five and their families who elect to enroll in 
-^* National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-180, § 722, 101 Stat. 1019, 1116 
(1987); H.R. REP. NO. 100-58, at 217 (1987) (rejecting OMB's proposed user fee initiative). This two year 
prohibition has long since expired but direct care user fees have not been re-pursued. 
-" National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 715,106 Stat. 2315, 2437-38 
(1992). 
^'^ See H.R. REP. NO. 101-923, at 617 (1990) (Conference Report commenting on §712 in the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, PUB. L. No. 101-510, which amended 10 U.S.C. § 1079(b) and § 1086(b) to 
increase the annual deductibles from $50 to $100/year for individuals and from $150 to $300/year for families). See 
also H.R. REP. No. 101-665, at 292-93 (1990) (the House Armed Services Committee notes that "[i]n the meantime, 
the deductible for even the most generous private sector plans has increased many-fold."). 
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TRICARE Prime.^" The Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan, by contrast, has sustained 
annual premium increases between 7.2% and 13% per year for the last seven years alone."" 
Moreover, employee premium contributions for employer sponsored health care are significantly 
higher than the Department of Defense enrollment fees and deductibles. ' 
There are also some of the more traditional tensions present as well. The insurance market 
evolved in large part on the ability of private insurers to control costs through risk pooling and 
cherry picking of beneficiaries who present low risks, either directly or indirectly through the 
benefits arid cost sharing arrangements offered.^^" The military system's much more defined 
benefit, coupled with the winner take all approach to contracting, not to mention lack of 
beneficiary data during the first series of contracts, resulted in a reduced ability to both calculate 
and uhimately limit risk. The difficulty in calculating risk, coupled with the notion that the 
provision of military health care is a national responsibility, and thus somewhat egalitarian in 
nature, runs counter to the accepted forces of commercial insurance and market competition. 
The combination of these factors resulted in contractors' willingness only to accept very narrow 
risk corridors in both CRI and TRICARE. Similarly, the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Modernization and Improvement Act anticipates such risk sharing challenges and has 
incorporated risk corridor provisions into Medicare Advantage. 
B. The Challenges of Customization and Heavy Regulation 
-" If such an election is made, however, there is no annual deductible under TRICARE Prime. See supra Table 1 . 
"^ TRCARE Health Plan Comparison with Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, Premium Increases 1998- 
2004, of http://www.tricare.osd.mil/TRICAREcomparisons/admin/FEHBP.cfm. The compounded effect of these 
amounts to a 94.9% cumulative increase. Id. 
^^' See THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND, AND THE HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUC. TRUST EMPLOYER, EMPLOYER 
HEALTH BENEFITS 2003 ANNUAL SURVEY, Section 6 (2003), at http://www.kff.org/insurance/ehbs2003- 
abstract.cfin. See also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 8-9. 
-*" See Bryan Ford, The Uncertain Case for Market Pricing of Health Insurance, 74 B.U. L. REV. 109, 121 -29 
(1994) (discussing the transition from community-rating to experience-rating for health insurance). 
^^' ROSENBLATT, supra note 23, at 132-33. 
-^- Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 221(c), 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
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The managed care insurance industry continues to operate as an off-the-slielf product.      As 
a result of the deregulation of health care through the enactment of ERISA^^"* and the subsequent 
judicial interpretations of that statute,^^' large employers sought to apply basic demand side 
market principles to the purchase of health care.^^^ "To employers the contractual approach to 
healthcare procurement seemed only natural: most of their day-to-day purchasing of other types 
of goods and services was done on such a basis.""^^ In this sense, the Department of Defense 
also sought to apply their normal procurement process to healthcare, as it has to other products 
and services. The difference, however, is the military's highly-regulated, excruciatingly detail- 
oriented procurement approach found itself at odds with the deregulated, free market approach of 
the commercial managed care industry. 
To say that the Department of Defense's significant customization requirements and heavy 
regulation greatly enhance the degree of difficulty is an understatement. At the core of these 
demands for customization is the military health care system's dual mission, which sometimes 
results in claims that neither mission is done well. Managed care support contractors become 
part of an integrated system of health care delivery and must work to maximize utilization of the 
direct care system. Furthermore, beneficiaries frequently bounce between military and civilian 
providers, with enrollment required for only one of the three TRIG ARE plans. All of these 
factors limit the natural operation and power of the market. 
^^■' Clark C. Havinghurst, Contract Failure in the Market for Health Services, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 47, 65 
(1994) (viewing health care as a "fungible commodity, that a purchaser identifies simply by pointing to the shelf on 
which are stacked the desired products"). 
^^ Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (1974) 
^^^ Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (distinguishing between insured and self 
insured plans for purposes of the ERISA deemer clause). 
^^^ ROSENBLATT, supra note 23, at 550. 
^*' Weiner & Lissovoy, supra note 9, at 77-78. 
268 "j]y.gg strategies for competing in health care markets appear to be important: increasing market share, 
increasing market power, and achieving efficiencies." Paul B. Ginsburg, The Dynamics of Market-Level Change, 22 
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With almost nine million beneficiaries, the military would appear to have significant market 
power. Much of this power is illusory however, as the direct care system is responsible for 
roughly seventy percent of the care provided?^^ Market power is further diluted by division of 
the market into regional contracts and the difficulty of guaranteeing a specified level of business 
with any degree of certainty. Providers are enticed to join networks and accept reduced fees in 
exchange for a more stable patient volume.^^° The military's fluid beneficiary population and 
lack of universal enrollment, however, make any such guarantee all the more difficult to 
quantify. Furthermore, military beneficiaries have opportunities that are not available to 
beneficiaries in employer-sponsored plans or other civilian health care systems. With the 
exception of enrollment in TRIG ARE Prime, beneficiaries are free to choose a mixture of 
military and civilian care through the use of space-available care at military treatment facilities 
and the ability to utilize TRICARE Standard and Extra essentially as they see fit.^^' With 
TRICARE accounting for only a small portion of many providers' income, government cost 
controls and added administrative burdens of the program have an even greater impact on 
provider willingness to accept TRICARE than they do on Medicare. 
Where managed care relies in large part on managed competition, the Department of 
Defense's regional, winner-takes-all approach to contracting arguably reduces competition at 
J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & LAW 363, 368 (1997). Arguably, TRlCARE's system design eliminates the first two 
strategies for potential bidders and greatly limits the third. 
269 ogp'-j- OF DEF., 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 10, at 52. 
-™ Kentucky Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 1474 (2003) (discussing network providers 
incentives). 
^^' In keeping with the Congressional trend of provided enhanced beneficiary freedom and choice, Congress 
eliminated the requirement for military beneficiaries to obtain nonavailability statements prior to seeking outpatient 
care through TRICARE Standard. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, 
§734, 110 Stat. 2422, 2598 (1996) (amending lOU.S.C. 1080 and 1086). See afco H.R. Rep. 104-563, at 321 
(1996): 
"The committee believes that beneficiaries who decline enrollment in the HMO option of the 
TRICARE program do so in order to retain their freedom of providers, at a much greater cost to 
them in the form of deductibles and copayments. The requirement for obtaining non-availability 
statements may compromise these beneficiaries freedom of choice, as well as their continuity of 
care when an extensive outpatient procedure is required. 
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several levels. First, the high degree of customization, cost to submit a proposal and winner- 
takes-all approach to contract award result in a reduced number of bidders per regional 
contract.^^^ Furthermore, once a contract is awarded there is no competition with other plans 
within the region - there is a single contractor who offers plans to beneficiaries. Where 
available, the beneficiary may choose between an HMO option, a PPO network and the 
traditional CHAMPUS fee-for-service, in addition to the ability to obtain free treatment on a 
space available basis at military treatment facilities. Unlike most private employers, the FEHBP 
and even Medicare+Choice, military beneficiaries are not provided with multiple HMO and PPO 
plans from which to choose, they have only a single option within each type of managed care 
plan. Finally, under the single contractor's umbrella of triple option managed care plans, the 
incentives between the plans are fairly small for beneficiaries. Consequently, both horizontal 
and vertical competition is limited to some extent through the military's customization of its 
system. In an effort to better integrate their systems of direct and purchased care, however, and 
to ensure military treatment facilities are operating under the same incentives as the civilian 
providers, TRICARE Prime provides some enroUees with an option of choosing between a 
military or civilian primary care manager, thereby creating internal competition within the 
system between military health care providers and civilian-provided care. 273 
"^" The CHAMPUS Reform Initiative is a prime example. Most recently, during the latest round of contracting for 
the next generation of TRICARE contracts, potential offerers also expressed concerns that there was a preference for 
existing contractors, making it more difficult for new offerors to enter the military arena. See Senate Finance 
Hearing, supra note 61 (statement of Lois E. Quam, Chief Executive Officer, Ovations, A UnitedHealth Group 
Company). 
~" TRICARE Progressing, supra note 167, at 4. An example of such an effort by the Department of Defense is the 
introduction of family centered care. Defense Health Programs Senate Hearing 2004, supra note 23\, at 12. While 
this has caused military providers to elevate their care and patient satisfaction levels in order to remain competitive, 
if the goal is to maximize the treatment being provided in military treatment facilities, which DoD believes to be the 
most cost-effective, one could question whether such an approach is consistent with the Department's underlying 
goals, especially in TRICARE Prime, the least expensive and most tightly controlled of the health care options. 
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Another challenge the military health care system continues to face is the incompatibility of 
customization and heavy regulation with normal free market forces. The more customized, 
proscriptive and heavily regulated the benefit, the less flexibility the market has to try and 
contain costs and utilize innovative strategies.^^'* The TRIG ARE contracting experiences of the 
mid-1990s support this premise. Additionally, there is extensive statutory and regulatory 
language governing the military health care system^^'' and significant Congressional oversight.^^^ 
Following the enactment of ERISA, and the resultant deregulation of the health care market in 
large respects, employers are largely free from governmental interference in their decision- 
making regarding the provision of employer-sponsored health care. The Department of 
Defense's experience reveals a sharp contrast, as the program has been governed by extensive 
legislative activity and subjected to heightened public scrutiny. 
977 • The administrative costs of customization are another factor worth consideration.      There is 
a direct corollary between the degree of customization, and its associated difficulties, and an 
escalation in administrative costs.^^^ For any given system, the challenge is to determine the 
^''^ Cf. Clark R. Havinghurst, Is the Health Care Revolution Finished?, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 4 (2002) (A 
managed care plan's ability to control costs is also influenced by state and federal regulation as well as potential 
exposure to legal liability.). 
-'' See Chapter 55 of Title 10, United States Code, and 32 C.F.R. Part 199. 
^^^ For over 15 years, Title VII in each annual National Defense Authorization Act has addressed health care issues. 
Language is frequently included in the annual Defense Appropriations Acts as well. Additionally, from 1985 
through 1996, Congress conducted over 200 hearings on military and verterans' health care related topics. 
Interestingly, spikes in the number of annual hearings conducted occurred in both the mid-1980s, when the 
Department of Defense began contemplating transitioning to a form of managed care, and again in 1993, when 
debates on the President's national health refonn proposals were at their height. The data used here were originally 
collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant 
number SBR 9320922, and were distributed through the Center for American Politics and Public Policy at the 
University of Washington and/or the Department of Political Science at Penn State University. Neither NSF nor the 
original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here. The data, compiled as part of an 
ongoing exhaustive study of all congressional hearings is available in searchable format at 
http://www.policyagendas.org/resources/citation.html. 
RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 111, at 3 (answering the question, "On the basis of experience in the civil 
sector, DoD turned to managed care for cost control and, in the [CRI] demonstration's first two years, wound up 
spending more instead. What went wrong?"). 
See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 168, at 49: "Meanwhile, an internal Defense Department budget document said 
administrative costs have grown from 4% of total healthcare costs before TRICARE implementation to 18% now 
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appropriate equilibrium, given the system's missions and goals. 
C. Major Barriers to Full Market Participation 
Major barriers to full market participation have become a reoccurring theme during both the 
CRI demonstration project and TRIG ARE program implementation. Many of the lessons 
learned from the initial nationwide implementation of TRIG ARE focused on contracting 
difficulties. Many of these challenges are directly attributable to the immense amount of 
customization demanded by the Department of Defense and the unique way in which they went 
about purchasing health care from the market. 
These contracts necessitated large, complex and lengthy proposals.^^^ For example, one 
offeror's complete proposal entailed 33,000 pages.^^' Gompanies were spending several million 
dollars just to prepare and submit a bid for one of the regional contacts.^^^ It is not surprising 
with this level of investment that every TRIGARE contract award has been protested by a losing 
bidder, at significant cost to the govemment.^^'^ The contract structure and its overly prescriptive 
requirements also limit a contractor's ability to be innovative and to use industry best practices, 
instead resulting in inefficiencies and ultimately increased costs.'^ "* Nonetheless, these detailed 
that several contracts are functioning. The document said administrative expenses have wiped out savings from 
more efficient healthcare delivery under TRICARE." 
^'' Cf. Havinghurst, supra note 263, at 56: 
An ironic development in the health care cost controversy is the recent outcry over the high 
administrative costs incurred in the United States health care system. A large fraction of these 
costs are incurred by payers in efforts to bargain with providers and manage utilization. Such 
efforts, although precisely the kind of cost-containment actions that the policies of the 1980's were 
designed to stimulate, are necessarily costly. From the complaints being heard today about the 
magnitude of these costs and the burdens they impose on providers, one could infer that some kind 
of equilibrium may have been reached and that additional administrative efforts by payers would 
not yield savings exceeding their costs. 
-*" Operational Difficulties and System Uncertainties, supra note 166, at 4 ("DoD's managed care procurement 
process is exfremely costly, complex, and cumbersome for all affected.")- 
^^' Lessons Learned Hearing, supra note 164, at 5. 
'''Id 
'^'^ Id. at 6 (highlighting examples of overly prescriptive requirements including emphasis on processes vice health 
outcomes and archaic requirements for manual utilization review of claims despite the fact that the contractor is the 
one at risk). 
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contracting procedures were believed necessary by the Department of Defense. 
In addition to the cost to submit a proposal, contractors have had to respond to numerous 
change orders. By the middle of 2000, over 1000 contract change orders had by made by the 
Department of Defense due to new initiatives or changes in law and regulations.      These 
contract adjustments, in addition to bid price adjustments have led to significant funding 
shortfalls and program instability for the Department of Defense.^^^ In an effort to provide more 
stability in the managed care support contracts, Congress amended 10 U.S.C. § 1073 to require 
the Secretary of Defense to implement all changes on a quarterly basis, to the maximum extent 
practicable.^^^ Conferees also urged the Department to consider implementing a policy to further 
289 limit changes. 
All of these factors have a negative impact on competition and to the extent that the 
Department of Defense is seeking to utilize the power of the market to increase the quality of 
health care and decrease costs, it will need to simplify its contracting approach as much as 
feasible. "Most, including DOD, feel the current contracts are too large, complex, and 
prescriptive in nature, limiting innovation and competition."^'*^ Furthermore, with respect to 
system design itself, the Department of Defense is faced with a Hobbesian choice: to utilize large 
and complex regional contracts in an effort to maximize uniformity and purchasing power while 
easing contract oversight for the Department or to manage smaller and potentially simpler 
^^^ "DoD officials recognize tliat prospective contractors are frustrated witli the process but consider the detailed 
procurement specifications, contracting process, and associated costs to be reasonable because of the size of the 
contracts and the need to establish a uniform program nationwide." DoD's Program Continues to Face Challenges, 
supra note 160, at 6. 
^** Lessons Learned Hearing, supra note 164, at 7 (changes included everything from specific billing procedures for 
certain kinds of care to significant benefit expansions). 
^*'' In 2001, the Department of Defense settled the outstanding confract disputes from the late 1990s for $2.1 billion. 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 7. See also Lessons Learned Hearing, supra note 164, at 7. 
-** National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 725, 113 Stat. 512, 698 (1999) 
(amending 10 U.S.C. §1073 by added paragraph (b)). 
-*' H.R. REP. NO. 106-301, at 772 (1999) (recommending changes to benefits be made annually to coincide with the 
beginning of the fiscal year to allow sufficient time to both prepare for and inform beneficiaries of benefit changes). 
^'° Lessons Learned Hearing, supra note 164, at 2. 
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contracts in an effort to better mirror the practices of the civilian sector. Either choice presents 
unique management challenges 291 
V.      Future Considerations for TRICARE Reform 
A.   Evaluation of the Next Generation of TRICARE Contracts 
One would hope that as the Department of Defense gains experience with TRICARE 
contracts, lessons learned from the current contract shortcomings would be addressed in 
designing future TRICARE contracts and to a large extent the Department of Defense has tried 
to do just that with assistance from the health care industry.^^^ Many of the guiding principles 
were adopted from previous lessons learned in an effort to simplify the process and maximize 
competition.^^^ To be less cumbersome on all, oral presentations by offerors replaced the 
"*' Lessons Learned Hearing, supra note 164, at 10-11. 
^'- Beginning in 1998, the Department of Defense began focusing on designing a new and improved contract 
veliicle. Their efforts were originally entitled Tricare 3.0. Following three years of development, the contract 
proposals were withdrawn when contractors indicated that the new contracts were still more proscriptive than 
anticipated and the structure of the financial penalties and incentives was less than desirable. The Department 
rededicated itself to this task and their efforts resulted in what have been tenned the next generation of TRICARE 
contracts ("T-Nex"). The curtent process is a much more open process with participation from industry. Senate 
Finance Hearing, supra note 61 (statement of Tom Cartato, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Plan 
Administration and COO for the TRICARE Management Activity) ("The procurement was developed in an open 
process, with input from industry and beneficiaries. Comments and questions from potential offerors were 
incorporated into evolving draft documents posted on an Internet site for public review."). See also 
http://www.fricare.osd.mil/pmo/t-nex/documents.cfm. For example, potential offerors were able to submit questions 
on the solicitation electronically to the confracting officer and those questions along with the Department's answers 
were posted on the website. A total of 1380 questions were submitted and answered, at 
http://www.fricare.osd.mi1/Confracting/H ealthcare/Solicitations/index.cfrn?fuseaction=main.faq&RecordID=22&So 
licitationID=MDA906-02-R-0006. 
"'^ The Department of Defense articulated their guiding principles as follows: 
We will develop Request For Proposals (RFPs) that are simpler and easier to understand, to ensure 
maximum competition for our business, and confracts that are less complex to administer. 
We will develop performance-based requirements, clearly defining our ultimate needs rather than simply 
listing our expectations. This will allow us to take advantage of innovative problem solving approaches 
already proven by our confractors, which we may not have envisioned. 
-    We will establish separate confracts (carve-outs) when it is in the best interests of the Government and our 
beneficiaries. We will organize work logically by core competencies. 
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voluminous submissions of old?^"*   Contractors share risk with the government for heahh care 
costs^^'^ and continue to received fixed fees for administrative costs. The incentive structure has 
been reahgned to provide strong incentives for customer service and beneficiary, provider and 
regional director satisfaction?^ 
The number of regional contracts has been cut from seven to three in an effort to enhance 
portability, reduce administrative costs and simplify contract administration.     Carve-outs are 
used to simplify the contracts "through selective identification of functions and services that can 
be more easily administered through single, nationw^ide contracts, or through more focused, local 
solutions."^^^ Nationwide contracts, including a national pharmacy mail order contract, a 
national retail pharmacy services contract, a TRICARE dual eligible fiscal intermediary contract 
to process TRICARE for Life claims, and a marketing and education products contract,^^^ will 
allow for uniformity and maximum utilization of the Department's purchasing power. Local 
support contracts for services including utilization management, appointing and transcription 
We will take advantage of lessons learned. For example, we will strive to eliminate redundancies, minimize 
risks, confine reporting to what really matters, continually reduce program weaknesses and make the best 
possible use of Government and contractor resources. 
TRICARE Next Generation Program Document, at http://www.tricare.osd.mil/pmo/t-nex/t- 
nex/Next_Generation_(Final_Revision).doc (emphasis added). 
-^^ Senate Finance Hearing, supra note 61 (statement of Tom Carrato, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Health Plan Administration and COO for the TRICARE Management Activity). 
^'^ A detailed discussion of the exact formula and methodology are beyond the scope of this paper, however, the 
basic structure involves establishing target healthcare pricing, with the government and contractor sharing in both 
gains and losses based on a comparison of actual costs to negotiated target costs. For additional details, see CAPT 
Walter Tinling, MSC, USN, "T-Nex" The Next Generation of Contracts Briefing 13-24 (Oct. 26, 2003), at 
http://www.tricare.osd.mil/conferences/2003/downloads/CaptWalterTinling.pdf 
-'^ Senate Finance Hearing, supra note 61 (statement of Tom Carrato, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Health Plan Administration and COO for the TRICARE Management Activity); CAPT Walter Tinling, MSC, USN, 
"T-Nex" The Next Generation of Contracts Briefing (Oct. 26, 2003), at 
http://www.tricare.osd.mil/conferences/2003/downloads/CaptWalterTinling.pdf 
-'^ Department of Defense Fact Sheet, Next Generation of TRICARE Contracts, at 
http://www.tricare.osd.mil/Factsheets/viewfactsheet.cfiTi?id=]85. 
^'^ Senate Finance Hearing, supra note 61 (statement of Tom Carrato, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Health Plan Administration and COO for the TRICARE Management Activity). 
-'' TRICARE Fact Sheet, Summary of Next Generation of TRIARE Contracts, at 
http://www.tricare.osd.mil/Factsheets/viewfactsheet.cfrn?id=]85. 
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sei-vices^°° will allow local, customized solutions.-^°' Faced with a Hobbesian choice regarding 
size and complexity of contracts, the Department of Defense's new multi-faceted approach has 
allowed it to reap some of the benefits of each approach. 
These efforts culminated with the Department of Defense issuing a Request for Proposal for 
the next generation of TRIG ARE managed care support services contracts in August 2002 with 
contract award in August 2003.   Not surprisingly, all three contract bid awards were protested 
by losing bidders. All three awards, however, have been upheld. '^^^ The new contracts will be 
phased in within each region during 2004. The immediate challenge the Department will face is 
to achieve a seamless transition between contracts. 
Despite the changes that were made to the next generation of TRICARE contracts, they still 
deviate from the market norm in many respects and are thus still viewed as undesirable by some 
in the insurance industry.^*^"* Interestingly, as Congress debated Medicare reform last session, the 
Senate Committee on Finance solicited testimony from large federal and private sector health 
care purchasers, including the Department of Defense, as well as from industry, to explore the 
300 (~,^pj Y/alter Tinling, MSC, USN, "T-Nex" The Next Generation of Contracts Briefing (Oct. 26, 2003), at 
http://www.tricare.osd.mil/conferences/2003/downloads/CaptWalterTinling.pdf. 
^°' "A major lesson learned is that localized contract management and oversight work well for health care delivery. 
Implementation of policy and program benefits is more effectively managed at the local level where there is the best 
understanding of regional needs." TRICARE Contracts: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Military Personnel, House 
Comm. on Armed Services, 107* Cong. (2001) (statement of Kenneth L. Farmners, Jr., Lead Agent, TRICARE 
Northwest, Region 11). 




^"^ Defense Health Program Home Hearing 2004, supra note 1 (opening statement of Representative John McHugh, 
Chairman): 
By the end of 2004,the Defense Health Program will have undergone really a colossal effort - 
during time of war, of course - of transitioning billions of dollars worth of existing contracts in 
new and very different contracts. And I think it's important we ensure that the transition to the 
new contracts in no way negatively impacts beneficiary health care, and that, hopefully, it 
improves optimizafion of military treatment facilities while providing and preserving high-quality, 
accessible health care. 
Whether the system is more attractive, or simply less unattractive, is in the eye of the beholder. 
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issue of purchasing health care services in a competitive environment.^^"'' The hearing was 
designed to examine "how a competitive model might - or might not - work for Medicare." 
Among other things, the Committee sought to examine different and distinct approaches to the 
purchase of health care, including the TRIG ARE winner takes all approach and an approach 
similar to that of the FEHBP where all qualified carriers are accepted.^°^ 
Most tellingly, a senior executive at UnitedHealth explained why, after investing 
considerable time and resources, they decided not to submit a bid on the next generation of 
TRICARE contracts and why the application of such a winner take all model to Medicare would 
be less than desirable.^"^ "There were many things we liked about the TRICARE solicitation, 
and we think it should provide significant improvements in the program. However, from our 
point of view, the solicitation was not structured in a manner that supported our three principles 
of effective competition."^°^ UnitedHealth testified that they believed the solicitation favored 
incumbent contractors^"' with its process oriented, highly customized approach, and limited 
-311 
contractors' ability to achieve best value under the contract. 
^"^ Senate Finance Hearing, supra note 61 (statement of Sen. Max Baucus, Ranking Member, Chairman, Sen. 
Comm. on Finance). 
'^ Id. (statement of Sen. Chucic Grassley, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on Finance). 
^"^ Id. (statement of Sen. Max Baucus, Ranking Member, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on Finance). 
'"* Id. (statement of Lois E. Quam, Chief Executive Officer, Ovations, A UnitedHealth Group Company). 
'^Ud 
''" Not surprisingly, four months later when the Department of Defense awarded the next generation of TRICARE 
managed care support services contracts, all three winners were incumbent companies. Triwest, awarded the 
Western region Nex-T contract, currently holds the contract for the Central Region. Humana, winner of the 
Southern Nex-T contract, currently services regions 3 and 4. HealthNet, formerly Foundation Health Systems, 
currently controls three contracts covering 5 regions, and was awarded the Northern Nex-T contract. 
^" Explaining the tremendous risk to contractors and general instability of the TRICARE program, Ms. Quam 
testified: 
Contractors are at risk for target health care costs, yet they have no control over many key 
decisions and factors that could impact TRICARE costs. These factors include benefit changes, 
implementation of best practices across the direct care system, major policy changes and structural 
changes to the MHS. Under this arrangement, the contractors assume tremendous risk while 
DoD maintains control of circumstances necessary for cost control and penalty avoidance. This 
approach creates a gross misalignment of interests and negative practices, such as change orders. 
Senate Finance Hearing, supra note 61, at 7 (statement of Lois E. Quam, Chief Executive Officer, 
Ovations, A UnitedHealth Group Company) (emphasis added). 
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Clearly efforts have been made in the next generation of TRIG ARE contracts to bring them 
more in line with industry practices. Those efforts, however, have been limited by the continued 
demand for customization through integration. Thus the unique structure of the military health 
care system thwarts, to a degree, efforts to maximize market participation, optimization and thus 
competition. 
B.   Further Considerations 
Escalating health care costs, beneficiary demands, and budget constraints will necessitate a 
review of the very nature of the military health care system on several fronts. First, is it a benefit 
or entitlement? This question, and its answer, will continue to bedevil both Congress and the 
o 1 J 
Department of Defense through future budget cycles. 
[T]he MHS is facing significant fiscal pressures. Thus, proposals to expand the 
program should be carefully crafted to avoid further erosion of the financial 
condition of the MHS. Also, in making important fiscal decisions for our nation, 
policymakers need to consider the fundamental differences between wants, needs, 
and what individuals and our nation can afford. This concept applies to all major 
aspects of government including decisions about military health care. It also 
points to the fiduciary and stewardship responsibility that we all share to ensure 
the sustainability of the military health system for current and fiiture generations 
within a broader context of also providing for other important DOD and national 
needs.^'^ 
Further compounding the problem, more and more military beneficiaries are utilizing the system 
due to the ever increasing richness of benefits, hampering the Department's ability to control 
health care costs.■^''^ The trend to date has clearly been one of increasing military benefits and 
^'- Concerns have also been expressed that as added benefits are contemplated, "the effect that any changes might 
have on establishing permanent claims and, thus future resources" must also be considered. Observations on 
Proposed Benefit Expansion Hearing, supra note 39, at 17. 
^'^ Mat 13. 
"'* "Defense health program costs continue to rise. In 2003, we experienced a 7 percent increase in new users and we 
expect the same this year in 2004. The growth is the result of increased use of Tricare by our eligible beneficiaries." 
Defense Health Programs Senate Hearing 2004, supra note 231 (testimony of William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, 
MBA, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs). 
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entitlements, irrespective of national health care insurance trends. With active Congressional 
committees of jurisdiction, virtual guaranteed annual legislative vehicles in the form of the 
Department of Defense authorization and appropriations acts, frequent congressional hearings 
where testimony from beneficiary advocacy groups is solicited, and a genuine respect for the 
contributions and sacrifices of military service members and their families, this trend comes as 
no surprise. As budget constraints mount, this trend may be in jeopardy,^'"'' although any such 
effort to trim back benefits will surely be an uphill battle. More likely, consumer driven options 
which emphasize increased cash compensation in exchange for higher out-of-pocket costs for 
health care may be proposed to slow growth and more closely resemble civilian sector trends. 
The appropriate size and structure of the military health care system has consumed years of 
debate^'^ and is sure to continue. Continuing pressure to reduce active duty end strength and 
military infrastructure,^'^ coupled with a shifting beneficiary population, make further reductions 
in the military's direct care system virtually guaranteed. Furthermore, history has proven that 
these competing dual missions frequently result in the sacrificing of one for the other. One must 
question whether the benefits of this continued struggle are worth the costs, as the direct care 
system is further dovmsized. 
^'^ Rick Maze, Pentagon Officials Dampen Hopes for Benefits Boosts, NAVY TIMES, at 20 (March 15, 2004): 
Senior Pentagon olFficials are making a concerted effort to dampen bipartisan fervor for improving 
military pay and benefits, especially for reservists and retirees. "We discourage the expansion of 
entitlements and the creation of new ones," said David S.C. Chu, undersecretary of defense for 
personnel an readiness, in March 2 testimony before a Senate subcommittee. The burden of 
paying for congressional mandates such as Tricare coverage for older retirees ... is huge, he said. 
"We want to focus attention on those still on active duty, not those who are finished with active 
duty." 
^'^ Some such suggestions have already been made. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6 (suggesting consideration 
of increased cash compensation packages combined with incrementally more expensive health insurance options). 
"'^ Observations on Proposed Benefit Expansion Hearing, supra note 39, at 13-14. 
^'^ The next Congressionally-authorized round of base realignment and closures is scheduled for 2005. Defense 
Realignment and Closure Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101 -510, 104 Stat. 1808 (1990), amended by National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, §3001, Pub. L. No. 107-107, 115 Stat. 1012, 1342 (2001). 
^'^ If history repeats itself, wartime medical readiness may once again find itself sacrificed in order to quell the 
immediate demands for peacetime care in a reduced capacity system. 
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The costs and benefits, and the very necessity, of the military heahh care system's unique 
structure should be considered in the context of reexamining its dual mission and the possibility 
of partial or total severance. Is an integrated system really required to achieve combat readiness, 
or are other methods available?-'^" Short of severance, other efforts may be pursued as well to 
ensure maximum utilization of military treatment facilities, through resource sharing, personal 
service contracting and other mechanisms to fully utilize capacity. All of these efforts 
presuppose of course that the Department of Defense's assertion that direct care is more cost 
effective than purchased care remains accurate as the 21^' century proceeds. This continued 
assertion begs the question of whether training requirements are what is really driving the 
integrated nature of the military health care system or whether the prospect of cost savings is the 
driving factor. Surely, if the prospect of cost savings is the driving force, such a universal 
aspiration does not necessitate the creation and maintenance of such a complex, sui generis 
•321 health care system. 
Short of large scale reform in the nature of dual mission severance or entitlement reductions, 
small scale reforms may be pursued as well to continue to optimize efficiencies by maximizing 
market characteristics, expanding resource sharing arrangements, and harnessing the power of 
new technologies. Furthermore, regardless of the unique way in which the Department of 
Defense entered the market for health care services, and the challenges created by its demand for 
customization, it also faces challenges shared with the rest of the nation. The Congressional 
^^^ See Robert A. Levy and Richard D. Miller, CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS, THE IMPLICATIONS OF UNIVERSAL 
ENROLLMENT FOR THE DOD HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (2000), at http://www.cna.org/research/pdfs/health/crm457.pdf. 
The study evaluated a number of options for a universal enrollment system for military health care, including 
providing non-active duty beneficiaries with FEHBP benefits and no access to the direct care system. In evaluating 
the impact on readiness of a reduced number of users of military treatment facilities, the study concluded "the loss 
of population would not create a significant problem for most specialties, but there would be problems for general 
surgery, orthopedic surgery and emergency medicine." Id at 5-6. These concerns could potentially be addressed 
through other mechanisms, including support and training affiliation agreements with civilian institutions. 
^'' A detailed examination is warranted to determine whether the direct care system is in fact more cost-effective, 
and if so, why. 
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Budget Office observes that the Department of Defense's increase in medical spending is not 
unique and may be attributable to the national escalation in health care costs: 
Some critics view the growth in DoD's medical spending as an indication that the 
department needs to manage its health care dollars more efficiently, increasing the 
amount of health care provided per dollar. But this analysis finds that however 
efficient or inefficient DOD may be in using its health care resources, the 
observed growth in spending (adjusted for changes in the department's accounting 
methods and changes in the size and mix of DoD's population of beneficiaries) 
has been consistent with the growth in per capita health care spending in the U.S. 
population as a whole over the past 15 years. 
A complete solution cannot be achieved by the Department of Defense alone. No one is immune 
and larger issues loom for the Untied States as a whole as we continue to struggle with how to 
address and ultimately curb the escalating growth in health care spending. 
Conclusion 
Though the program is sometimes wrought with overwhelming complexities and 
seemingly endless crises, we did not during creation, nor do we now, lose sight of 
the fact that what we all do has deep purpose and meaning and carries with it an 
awesome responsibility... a responsibility to the men and women who serve in 
defense of our freedom and to their readiness for duty. " 
The military health care system has undergone a tremendous transformation and made great 
progress in improving military beneficiaries' access to quality health care but the transformation 
has been anything but smooth, as the public spotlight on this program has revealed. The 
Department of Defense's experiences in part are reflective of the trial and error the entire nation 
was experiencing with managed care concepts at the end of the twentieth century. It also 
provides a fascinating case study of a major purchaser's attempts to bend the insurance market to 
^^' CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 2. The Congressional Budget Office calculates 56% of the total growth 
in spending per active-duty member over the last 15 years is attributable to national changes in health care costs in 
general; 41% is attributable to the shift in mix of beneficiary population and accrual financing (which are unlikely to 
recur); and the remaining 3%) is the net effect of a variety of offsetting factors from changes within the military 
health care system including enhanced benefits and gained efficiencies. Wat ix-x. 
^^^ TRICARE Program: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Military Personnel, House Comm. on Armed Services, 107' 
Cong. (2001) (statement of David J. Mclntyre, Jr., President and CEO, TriWest Health Alliance). 
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its needs and the results, including continued movement towards meeting the insurance industry 
halfway. A uniquely customized health care system like the Department of Defense's system 
exacerbates the challenges of transformation to managed care. 
The ongoing struggles and policy dilemmas facing the Department of Defense are not 
unique, as the country and our political leaders continue to debate the desirability, and 
feasibility, of privatization and the appropriate role of the market in government- 
sponsored entitlement programs. Medicare is facing some of the same challenges the 
Department of Defense is in its attempt to contain costs and harness the power of a 
competitive market. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services is busily working 
on implementing the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
of 2003 with high hopes for market participation in Medicare Advantage. 
Meanwhile, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan recently "warned that the federal 
government 'has promised more retirement benefits than it can pay for' and 'to avoid damaging 
the economy in the future' it must consider reducing spending on entitlement programs such as 
Medicare."'^^'* This will be a tough sell.'^^""' Any attempt to trim back military health care benefits 
will be an equally tough sell as Congressional oversight committees have repeatedly 
demonstrated their devotion to military compensation and quality of life issues, frequently 
irrespective of Administration requests, and beneficiary advocacy groups are articulate, well- 
organized and quite powerful. 
Questions regarding the Department of Defense's willingness to consider bifurcating 
^^■^ Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Federal Government Should Cut Entitlement Programs, Including Medicare, Not 
Increase Taxes to Address Federal Deficit, Greenspan Says, Kaiser Daily Health Pol'y Rep. 1 (Feb. 26, 2004). See 
also The Economic Outlook and Current Fiscal Issues: Hearing Before House Comm. on Budget, 108* Cong. (Feb. 
25,2004) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chainnan, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), at 
http://www.house.gov/budget/hearings/greenspanstmnt022504.pdf 
'-^ See Joseph J. Schatz, Hill Not Biting on Greenspan's Social Security Bait, CQ TODAY (Feb. 25,2004); Nell 
Henderson, Fed Chief Urges Cut in Social Security, WASH. POST, at Al (Fe. 26, 2004). 
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their health care dehvery systems and the extent to which they will seek to trim back 
entitlements to more accurately resemble those of standard employer provided health care 
are sure to continue. "It is important, however, in the design of [a] program, that policy 
makers fully understand the misleading effects of thinking of a health care payment plan 
as a form of insurance and understand the limits to market based solutions."      Likewise, 
there are similar market limitations that must be understood in the context of the current 
military health care system. 
Even in a customized, egalitarian-driven system, it is important to have realistic 
expectations and prioritized goals. Understanding where changes can be made within the 
current structure to maximize mission, beneficiary and provider satisfaction and contain 
costs and the inherent limitations of such an entitlement program is critical. Only then 
can success be truly measured. As currently designed, it is intellectually inconsistent to 
make straight comparisons between the FEHBP and TRICARE. One is not necessarily 
better than the other. They are simply diverse programs, pursuing different public policy 
goals, within a broad spectrum of health care financing and delivery mechanisms. 
TRICARE finds itself in the precarious position of managing its health care entitlement 
under a discretionary budget program, attempting to contain costs on an ever expanding 
benefit and beneficiary population, and seeking to capitalize on market principles 
notwithstanding heavy government regulation. Some may just label such an endeavor 
mission impossible. 
As budgetary pressures continue, both Congress and the Administration will have to 
consciously balance the costs and benefits of this uniquely structured entitlement 
^^•^ Bryan Ford, The Uncertain Case for Market Pricing of Health Insurance, 74B.U.L.REV. 109, 143 (1994) 
(discussing designing a plan for universal health care coverage). 
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program to determine whether integration of the dual mission and continued 
classification of military health care as an "earned entitlement" vice a civilian-equivalent 
employee benefit are w^orth the added cost, or whether a paradigm shift is in order. 
As the nation moves forward in the twenty-first century, health reform is anything but 
static. "To account for continuing and rapid changes in the nature of managed care," 
astute scholars have best described the state of affairs as "the continuing transformation 
of managed care."''^^ For all its warts, "there is no going back to the unmanaged care that 
managed care replaced."''^^ The only remaining question then, is how Congress and the 
Department of Defense will proceed forward with managed care for military beneficiaries 
in the face of these challenges. Only time will tell. 
/ believe that our benefit always should be better, and it should be better because 
of the sacrifice that our men and women who are in uniform today, as well as our 
retirees, have made to their country. But there is the issue of how much different 
can it afford to be? " 
^-^ RAND E. ROSENBLATT, SARA ROSENBAUM & DAVID M. FRANKFORD, LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM 280 (Supp. 2001-2002). 
^^^ John V. Jacobi, After Managed Care: Gray Boxes, Tiers and Consumerism, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 397,409 (2003). 
^*' Defense Health Program House Hearing 2004, supra note 1 (testimony of William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, 
MBA, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs). 
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